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Abstract
This paper extends the ongoing discussion on optimal exchange rate regimes to the issue of pro-poor 
growth. To analyze empirically the poverty effects of exchange rate regimes, we estimate the distribution 
effects of different exchange rate arrangements on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. In addition, we 
test the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to capture potential trade-offs between poverty 
effects through overall economic growth and distribution.  
To analyze this question, we collect an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data 
on the first and second quintile share from 76 countries and use two recently proposed de facto exchange 
rate  regime  classifications,  Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  (2002)  and  Reinhart/Rogoff  (2003).  To  cover 
econometric issues, cross-country variation and dynamic aspects of within-country changes of the income 
of the poor, we apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system GMM estimation. 
We  estimate  the  poverty  effects  of  different  exchange  rate  regimes  for  all  countries  and,  separately, 
developing  and  industrial  countries  due  to  considerable  differences  in  economic  structure,  access  to 
international capital markets and soundness of domestic financial systems. 
Empirical  findings  vary  considerably  with  respect  to  three  aspects.  First,  findings  for  the  Levy-
Yeyati/Sturzenegger  (2002) and  Reinhart/Rogoff  (2003)  classification differ significantly with  respect  to 
similar exchange rate categories. Thus the classification process of exchange rate regimes affects critically 
the  policy  conclusions.  Second,  statistically  significant  exchange  rate  regimes  in  the  Reinhart/Rogoff 
(2003) classification impact positively on the poor in developing countries, but negatively on the poor in 
industrial  countries.  Thus  exchange  rate  regimes  affect  very  differently  the  poor  in  developing  and 
industrial countries in the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification. Third, statistical significance of exchange 
rate  regimes  in  the  system  GMM  approach  differs  considerably  for  adjusted  and  unadjusted  income 
inequality measures.   
Due to these varying and only weakly robust empirical findings, a concise policy recommendation with 
respect  to  poverty-reducing  exchange  rate  regimes  is  difficult.  Nevertheless,  positive  effects  of 
intermediate  regimes  of  the  Reinhart/Rogoff  (2003)  classification  in  developing  countries  should  be 
emphasized, showing at least a tendency to not  negative and possible positive effects of intermediate 
regimes on the poorest 40 percent in developing countries. 2
1. Introduction
In the 1990s developing and transitional countries were hit by devastating financial crises and 
speculative  attacks  resulting in an  ongoing  debate  on  the  optimal  exchange  rate  regime.  In 
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2. Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth
2.1 Literature Review 
The relationship between exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth is only rarely discussed 
in the literature (Lustig 2000).
1 Thus we look at the impact of exchange rate regimes on overall 
economic  growth,  the  discussion  of  real  exchange  rate  misalignment  and  contractionary 
devaluation for possible different effects of exchange rate arrangements on the income of the 
poor. 
Historically, discussions on optimal exchange rate arrangements evolved from debates on the 
stabilizing  effect  of  flexible  exchange  rates  under  international  capital  mobility,  types  of 
structural  characteristics  (e.g.  exposure  to  shocks,  financial  development)  decisive  for  the 
choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime to issues of credibility of monetary policy and 
nominal  anchors  to  cover  inflation  bias,  optimal  currency  area  hypothesis,  endogeneity  of 
structural  characteristics  and  speculative  attacks.  Resulting from these  discussions,  different 
exchange  rate  regimes may be  optimal for countries  with  different structural  characteristics, 
types of exogenous shocks, and different macroeconomic and political environments which may 
change  over  time  (Isard  1995,  Frankel  1999).
2 This  view is  emphasized  especially  for 
developing  and  transitional  countries  caused  by  their  heterogeneous  economical  situation 
(Mussa/Masson/Swoboda/Jadresic/Mauro/Berg 2000). While the two corner solution is recently 
proposed for developing countries (Krueger 1999, Fisher 2001), critics opt for adjustable pegs to 
balance the conflict of macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Hausknecht 2001). 
In line with the debate on the optimal exchange rate system, the impact of different exchange 
rate arrangements on economic growth is ambiguously discussed in economic theory. Refering 
to the growth accounting approach, exchange rate regimes could impact on economic growth 
through  the  rate  of factor accumulation  (investment, labor)  or  total factor productivity.  Fixed 
exchange rate arrangements may promote investment and trade by reduced price uncertainties 
and  relative  price  volatility,  lowered  real  interest  rates  and  decreased  real  exchange  rate 
volatility which  in turn  may increase  growth.
3 In addition, fixed exchange rate  regimes  may 
foster growth by lower inflation and less vulnerability to speculative exchange rate fluctuations if 
the  peg  is  credible  (Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  2001,  Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  2002a, 
Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault 2002). 
On the other side, fixed exchange rate regimes could also diminish the efficiency of a given 
stock of capital since external trade may be reduced due to higher protectionist pressure in the 
1
On  a  dynamic macro-micro modelling  of the impact  of macroeconomic policy  and  variables  on  poverty  in  a CGE 
framework, see the IMMPA program of the Worldbank (Agénor/Fofack/Izquierdo 2003).
2
For  a  detailed  survey  of  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  nine  alternative  exchange  rate  regimes,  see 
Edwards/Savastano (1999).4
absence  of  exchange  rate  adjustments  (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf  1997).
4 Furthermore, 
investment can be impeded by increased real interest rates and uncertainty which may result 
from expectations of a regime switch due to negative external shocks or weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals  (Montiel  2003).  While  the  lack  of  adjustment  and  the  possibility  of  frequent 
external shocks under a fixed exchange rate regime may imply increased output volatility, the 
impact on long-run growth is less obvious (Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2001).
Empirical evidence on the impact of different exchange rate regimes on economic growth is 
ambiguous.
5 In the World Economic Outlook (1997) no clear relationship between exchange 
rate regimes and economic growth is found for developing countries, while inflation is typically 
lower  and  less  volatile  in  countries  with  pegged  rates  than  in  countries  with  flexible  rates. 
Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf (1997) estimate the different impact of fixed, intermediate and flexible 
exchange rate regimes on growth, inflation and output volatility using de jure exchange rate 
regimes (official IMF classification) for 136 countries in the period 1960 - 1980. While growth 
varies only slightly across different exchange rate arrangements, fixed exchange rate regimes 
compared with flexible regimes tend to increase output volatility, but are associated with lower 
inflation.  Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  (2002a)  measure  the  impact  of  fixed,  intermediate  and 
flexible exchange rate regimes on growth and output volatility using de facto exchange rate 
regimes for 183 countries in the period 1974 –                                            
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3 This reasoning assumes a positive effect of higher trade on economic growth.
4 This line of argument would assume positive productivity effects of increased trade. 5
markets,  pegged  regimes  are  more  crisis  prone  in  emerging  markets.  In  addition,  flexible 
regimes  are  more sustainable  in advanced  economies  combined with  slightly  higher  growth 
rates.   
Another point of departure for possible differences of exchange rate systems on poverty are the 
effects of real exchange rate misalignment, i.e. difference between actual and equilibrium real 
exchange rate (RER) 
6, and nominal devaluations on real output. While the construction of an 
appropriate measure assessing RER misalignment is controversially discussed in the literature 
(Hinkle/Montiel 1999, Razin/Collins 1999) 
7, persistent RER misalignment may be associated 
with  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  assuming  nominal  rigidities  (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf  1997, 
World Bank 2001a, Bailliu/Lafrance/Perraul 2002, Montiel 2003).
8 Alberola/López/Servén (2004) 
find a considerable impact of the hard peg (curreny board) on the overvaluation of the RER in 
Argentina. 
RER  misalignment  is  important  in  our  context  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  RER 
misalignment can cause inefficient allocation of resources across sectors and price distortions 
(Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf  1997).  Second,  severe  or  persistent  RER  misalignment  (e.g. 
overvaluation)  may  lead  to  adjustment  expectations  resulting  in  capital flight  and  increased 
likelihood  of  currency  crisis  (Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault  2002,  Montiel  2003).  Third,  RER 
misalignment  may  be  associated  with  lower  medium  to  long-run  growth  by  influencing 
investment  and  the  competitiveness  of  the  tradable  sector. While  these  costs  of  RER 
misalignment are assumed to be positive related to the extent of financial integration (Montiel 
2003),  misalignment  volatility  may  also  harm  economic  growth  (Edwards/Savastano  1999, 
Razin/Collins 1999). Empirical evidence seems to confirm the negative impact of average RER 
misalignment and its volatility on overall economic growth (Edwards 1989, Cottani/Cavallo/Khan 
1990,  Ghura/Grennes  1993,  Razin/Collins  1999).  However,  this  effect  might  be  driven  by 
important nonlinearities, i.e. while only very high overvaluations appear to be associated with 
slower growth, moderate to high undervaluations seem to foster growth (Razin/Collins 1999). 
Nominal devaluations are associated with different kind of pegs using the exchange rate as 
important policy instrument. Devaluations are usually a result of inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies with severe overvaluation of the real exchange rate. A nominal devaluation, however, 
5
Connected to this issue Baxter/Stockmann (1989) found that the cyclical behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates 
(output, consumption, etc.) does not depend systematically on exchange rate regimes.
6 Equilibrium  real  exchange  rate can  be  defined  as  the  real  exchange  rate  that  would  prevail  if  the  economy  is 
simultaneously in internal and external balance. While internal balance describes an economy operating at its potential 
output,  external  balance  means  that  the  courrent  account  deficit  equals  the  expected  sustainable  capital  inflows 
(Razin/Collins 1999, Montiel 2003). 
7 for  an  overview  of  empirical  studies  of  real  exchange  rate  misaligment  in  developing  countries,  see 
Edwards/Savastano (1999).
8 RER overvaluation may be caused by fixed exchange rate regimes due to difficulties to exit the peg or the failure to 
accommodate secular deterioration in terms-of-trade (World Bank 2001a). Generally, however, the real exchange rate is 
an endogenous variable, which cannot be changed directly by policy makers. Thus the exchange rate regime is only 
one of several fundamental macroeconomic variables in determining indirectly the level of the real exchange rate and its 
misalignment. For an useful distinction in short-run and long-run RER misalignments and their relation to exchange rate 
regimes, see Montiel (2003).6
must not  necessarily  translate into a  real  devaluation  due  to inflationary pressure  (Edwards 
1989, Ghei/Hinkle 1999). The effects of devaluations on real output and economic growth in 
developing  countries  are  controversially  discussed.  A  devaluation  may  lead  to  contraction 
caused  by  its  effect  on  both  aggregate  demand  and  supply (Krugman/Taylor  1978, 
Agénor/Montiel  1999).  Empirical  evidence  appears  to confirm the  contractionary  devaluation 
hypothesis at least in the short run, even if the applied methodology is critisized (Edwards 1989, 
Agénor 1991, Kamin/Klau 1998, Agénor/Montiel 1999, Rogers/Kamin 2000).
2.2  Effects of exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth
Relying on the literature review, the choice of the exchange rate regime may affect the income 
of the  poor via its effect on macroeconomic volatility (shock  absorption), its  relation to real 
exchange rate misalignment, its proneness to currency crises, via devaluation and inflation.     
Output volatility (shock absorption)
Macroeconomic  volatility  and  high  output  fluctuation,  resulting  from  exogenous  shocks  and 
instable policy regimes, may impact on poverty (Breen/Garcia-Peñalosa 1999). The income of 
the poor may be affected by a negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on investment and 
growth  due  to  distorted  price  signals  and  expected  rate  of  return.  Increased  precautionary 
savings caused by higher uncertainty about future income may also lead to either decreased or 
increased  economic  growth.  In addition,  credit market  effects,  i.e. higher  incidence  of  credit 
rationing or increased risk premium and borrowing rates for private firms may negatively affect 
the income of the poor (Agénor 2002). 
Identifying the predominant economic shocks and the structural features of a specific country 
and choosing the exchange rate regime which best insulates the economy against shocks could 
be seen as one reason for different impact of exchange rate arrangements on pro-poor growth. 
This  reasoning  would  be based  on the  assumption that  exchange  rate  regimes  dampen  or 
amplify  the  negative  effects  of  exogenous  shocks  and  adjustment  processes 
(Ames/Brown/Devarajan/Izquierdo  2002,  Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault  2002,  Edwards/Levy-Yeyati 
2003).
9 Refering to a Mundell-Flemming framework, fixed exchange rate regimes are assumed 
to stabilize output in case of nominal shocks to domestic asset markets, while real shocks are 
more easily absorbed by flexible exchange rate regimes.
10 Structural features of an economy 
may determine  the  optimality of a  regime  with  respect  to external financial shocks  (Montiel 
2003).
11 Traditional  analysis  of  exchange  rate  regimes,  however,  is  confined  to  extreme 
9 Even  if the  long-run  equlibrium  effect  may  be  the  same  for  fixed and  flexible  regimes,  the  short- to  medium  run 
adjustment process may differ considerably due to different exchange rate arrangements (Lustig 2000). 
10 Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf (1997) and Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) find that fixed exchange rate are associated with 
higher output volatility.
11 Structural characteristics of economies, however, may not be exogenous to the choice of exchange rate regimes 
(Isard 1995). 7
arrangements  (hard  pegs  or  pure  floats)  in  comparison  to  a  broad  scale  of  intermediated 
regimes used in developing countries (Montiel 2003). 
RER misalignment and currency crises
Exchange rate regimes may impact on pro-poor growth via RER misalignment. First, inefficient 
allocation of resources between foreign and domestic goods and price distortions due to RER 
misalignment  may  lead  to  distributional  effects.  Second,  reduced  investment  and 
competitiveness of the tradable sector due to RER misalignment may also result in additional 
effects  for the  poorest.  The  costs  for the  poor  may be  increased  by  the  extent of financial 
integration in international capital markets (at least in the short run).
12 In addition, misalignment 
volatility may harm pro-poor growth even if the direction of these effects may be ambiguous and 
dependent  on  the  amount  of  RER  misalignment  (Edwards/Savastano  1999,  Razin/Collins 
1999). Fourth, severe or persistent RER misalignment may be especially costly for the poor as 
they usually can not hedge against the adjustment risks and considerable RER misalignment 
may increase  significantly  the  probability  of a  currency  crisis  (Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault  2002, 
Montiel 2003). 
Currency crises may be associated with certain types of exchange rate regimes. Relying on the 
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13 Looking  at  the  two  de  facto  exchange  rate  regime 
classifications used in our sample, currency crises are relatively prevalent in dirty floats in the 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  (2002b)  classification.  Even  if  relative  frequency  is  much  lower, 
currency crises are also present in all other classifications (table 4). While currency crises are 
not present for the category freely floating in the coarse Reinhart/Rogoff classification (2003), 
currency crises are relativey dominant in freely falling and associated  with pegged regimes, 
limited flexbility and managed floating to a lower relative frequency (table 4).
14 If we replace 
freely falling by one of the four other regimes in a 4-way classification, currency crises of freely 
falling are mainly attributed to freely floating and managed floating.
15
A currency crisis may impact negatively on the income of the poor by unemployment effects on 
low skilled labour in both the formal and informal sector. In addition, wealth effects and changes 
12 While procyclical access to world capital markets of developing countries may increase macroeconomic instability, 
greater penetration of foreign banks may result in reduced access to loans by small and medium-size firms. In addition, 
financial openness may hurt the poor by credit rationing caused by increased volatility and lower growth rates due to 
capital flight and international risk sharing (Agénor 2003).
13 For  a  detailed  discussion  on  the  feasability  conditions  using  intermediate  exchange  rate  regimes  in  developing 
countries in the context of capital mobility and a broad discussion on causes of currency crisis, see Montiel (2003). 
14 One reason for the prevalence of freely falling is the fact, that category freely falling is attributed to the six months 
immediatly following a currency crisis (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003). 
15 For reasoning and construction of the reduced 4-way RR classification, see section 3.2. 8
in the value of assets induced by changes in interest rates or asset prices may affect the income 
distribution. Furthermore, a financial crisis could lead to spending cuts in social expenditures 
(health,  education,  social  security)  which  may  adversely  affect  the  poor.
16 Baldacci/de 
Mello/Inchauste  (2002)  find  evidence  for  this  hypothesis  applying  a  difference-in-difference 
methodology in a cross-country analysis. The size of the poverty effect, however, may depend 
critically on the initial structure and the composition of the social spending programs since social 
expenditures often benefit disproportionately upper-income households in developing countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002, Agénor 
2002, Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit 2003).
17 Finally, the poor may be additionally affected by 
a currency crisis in the longer-run via asymmetric effects, i.e. the decrease of the income of the 
poor in recessions is not offset by the positive effects of expansions (Agénor 2002).
18
Devaluation
Fixed exchange rate arrangements may entail nominal devaluations of the official exchange rate 
in case of overvalued RER. However, the effects of nominal devaluations on the income of the 
poor  are  ambiguous  depending  also  on  its  effect  on  the  RER  (Edwards  1989,  Ghei/Hinkle 
1999).  On  the  demand  side,  a  depreciation  of  the  RER  would  benefit  consumers  of 
nontradables, while it would harm consumers of imported goods. Thus the depreciation could 
increase domestic food prices due to higher prices of imported food. This could lead to negative 
effects on the poor, if they are net consumers of food (Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002). On 
the supply-side, improved agricultural exports may increase the income of the rural poor, while 
diminished demand for labor in the nontraded sector may decrease the income of the urban
poor,  i.e. earnings fall for those  employed in the  non-trade  sector  with  respect  to the  trade 
sector.
19 Thus  RER  depreciation  would  positively  affect  the  poor, if they  work mainly  in  the 
tradable  sector,  but  consume  nontradables  (Ames/Brown/Devarajan/Izquierdo  2002,  Agénor 
2002). In addition, increased prices for imported intermediate input and capital goods may result 
in more demand for unskilled workers. Negative supply shocks are also possible, if the economy 
is a net importer of intermediate inputs (Agénor 2002). Empirically, RER depreciation is found to 
                                                           ’                                      
                                                           
16 Curtailing  government  expenditures  may  also  lead  to  increased  poverty  via  cuts  in  real  wages  and  layoffs  of 
employees in the public sector (Agénor 2002). 
17 Cuts in social spending may nevertheless lead to reduced poverty if social expenditures are better targeted to the 
poor (Agénor 2002). 
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Inflation 
High inflation may discourage the income of the poor via disruptive effects on economic growth 
(Temple 1999, Montiel 2003, Epaulard 2003). In addition, the poor may be hit disproportionately 
by negative effects of high and variable inflation rates on their income due to its denomination in 
nominal terms without access to indexation, a decline in real wages due to rigidity of nominal 
                                                                          ‘             ’                
                            
20 Empirical evidence on a negative distribution effect of inflation, 
however, is mixed. One reason may be that economy-wide inflation rates do not correctly reflect 
the effects of price changes relevant for the poor (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, 
Dollar/Kraay  2001,  Anderson/White  2001,  Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides  2002,  Agénor  2002, 
Ames/Brown /Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Epaulard 2003).
Exchange rate regimes (together with monetary policy) may have different impact on inflation. 
Fixing the exchange rate to the currency of a country with anti-inflation reputation could increase 
credibility since announcing a future path of the exchange rate may serve as a commitment 
mechanism.
21 Thus  inflation  rate  or  inflation  bias  may  be  reduced  due  to  the  use  of  the 
exchange rate as nominal anchor. On the other hand, fixed exchange rate regimes face the risk 
of devaluation bias and loss of credibility which may result in higher inflation if the structural 
features of the economy are inappropriate to the choice of the fixed exchange rate regime and 
exiting the fixed exchange rate regime is difficult (Isard 1995, Ames/Brown /Devarajan/Izquierdo 
2002, Montiel 2003). Empirical evidence supports the view that fixed exchange rate regimes are 
associated  with  lower  and  more  stable  inflation  (World  Economic  Outlook  1997, 
Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997, Levy-Yeyati/ Sturzenegger 2001). 
To summarize, our discussion of the theoretical channels and empirical literature does not show 
a clear superiority or inferiority of one category of exchange rate regime with respect to pro-poor 
growth.  Exchange  rate  arrangements  may  impact  on  pro-poor  growth  through  various  and 
possibly  contradictory  effects.  However, there  seems  to be  a  tendency  to attribute  negative 
poverty effects to intermediate exchange rate regimes in developing countries with liberal capital 
markets due to an assumed higher likelihood of currency crises. 
19 In addition, a higher cost-of-living index in the urban areas may offset the positive supply effect on small farmers in 
the tradable sector (Agénor 2002).
20 In  addition,  a  change in distribution  of income  and  wealth may  be  explained by  high  and  variable  inflation, if the 
middle-class as holders  of  nominal liabilites benefits from its loss of  value  and the  poor  holds  only  nominal  assets 
(Agénor 2002). 
21 On a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages announcing a predetermined exchange rate path as 
commitment mechanism, see Montiel (2003). 10
3.   Data sources and descriptive statistics
3.1   Data on income inequality measures
Empirical tests on the impact of exchange rate arrangements on pro-poor growth are limited by 
data availability. In addition, incomparability of inequality data can cause severe problems in 
cross-section  analysis  (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).  Due  to different concepts  used  in income 
distribution surveys across time and space cross-section analysis of pro-poor growth using first 
and second quintile share of income has to be applied with caution. Data on income inequality 
may  vary  in  various  aspects,  e.g.  in  income  concept  (income,  expenditure),  tax  treatment, 
reference  unit  (household/family/household  equivalent/person)  or  coverage  (age/area 
/population). Concerning the income definition, expenditure should be preferred to income for 
developing  countries  for  reasons  of  practical  measurement,  especially  for  rural  (poor) 
households  (Atkinson  1993,  Deaton  1997).  In  addition,  data  on  income  distribution  can  be 
based  on  different  sources  (national  household  surveys,  income  tax  records,  social 
security/labor market agency records).
22 Thus comparability of data on first and second quintile 
share of income has to be handled with care. While data on quintile shares of income can not 
be restricted to completely comparable samples due to limited data availability, only samples 
should be used with observations as fully consistent as possible (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).  
Our data on the first and second quintile share of income (and the Gini coefficient) are based on 
four  sources:  the  UNU/WIDER-UNDP  World  Income  Inequality  Database,  Version  1.0,  12 
September  2000,  the  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996,  1998a)  database,  the  Global  Poverty 
Monitoring described in Chen/Ravallion (1997, 2000)
23 and the World Development Indicators 
(2002a) Table 2.8 (table 1). The observations are chosen by an successive selection procedure 
with  restriction  criteria  motivated  by  the  problems  outlined  above.  For  the  UNU/WIDER 
database (2000), we first restrict the sample to data based on surveys covering all area, all 
population, all age and fulfilling the 1 OKIN quality rating.
24 Second, as we are interested in pro-
poor growth,  only  countries  with  at  least  two  spaced  observations  are  selected.  To  cover 
medium-to-long  run  growth  and  measurement  errors  due  to  fluctuations  we  draw  the  first 
available observation and every following with at least three years distance to the preceding. 
Only  in  five  cases  have  we  allowed  for  a  two  year  distance  within  a  spell  for  pragmatic 
reasons.
25 In addition, the income concept and income recipients (reference unit) have to be 
identical for  each  spell.
26 As  noted  in  the  description  of the  data  set  used  by  Dollar/Kraay 
22 see for further details UNU/WIDERUNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, User
guide; see also Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).
23 The  Global  Poverty  Monitoring  is  available  under  www.worldbank.org/research/povmon/index.htm  and  continually 
updated. 
24 Reliable  income  or  expenditure  data  referring  to  the  entire  (national)  population,  not  affected  by  apparent 
inconsistencies (UNU/WIDER –                                                                                      
       
25 Bulgaria 1991 –                  –                –                    –                –   
26 One can further strengthen the selection criteria by also requiring the same type of survey for each spell to control for 
differences in survey design not captured by the same income definition and reference unit. Due to data availability, 
however, we omitted this idea. 11
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27 The Global Poverty Monitoring data set is based on nationally representative surveys. 
All measures of household living standards are normalized by household size. The distribution 
and empirical Lorenz curves are household-size weighted. The income shares are estimated 
from primary  data  sources  using  parameterized Lorenz  curves  with flexible functional forms 
(Chen/Ravallion 1997). We have selected the sample on data of first and second quintile share 
of income due to the restriction criteria outlined above. In addition, actual data are drawn from 
the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 using the same methodology for low- and 
middle- income countries as used by the Global Poverty Monitoring data set.
28 This selection 
procedure has resulted in 371 observations in total, 231 for developing, 27 for transitional and 
113 for industrial countries. Finally, data on exchange rate regimes have to be available for the 
selected country-year observations reducing the total sample further to 343 observations for 76 
countries (212, 18 and 113 for developing, transitional and industrial countries, respectively). 
In our regressions we use, first,  the same income concept and reference unit for each spell, i.e. 
we do not construct all possible spells between the observations in each country.
29 In addition, 
we select in some cases two observations per country per year, exchanging the observations 
between the spells (table 1). Second, in adjusting the income inequality measures to form all 
possible  spells  in  each  country,  we  regress  the  first/second  quintile  share  and  the  Gini 
coefficient on dummy variables for different income definitions and regional dummies.
30 The 
adjusted first/second quintile share and Gini coefficient are then calculated by subtracting the 
estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures to form 
a  sample  of inequality measures  corresponding  to the  distribution  of household  expenditure 
(table 2).
31 In general, the number of observations per country varies significantly from 2 (almost 
all Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe countries) to 15 (India).
Mean income of the poorest is measured as the share of income earned by the poorest first and 
second quintile times mean income, divided by 0.2. Data on mean income are based on the 
27 Canada 1951, 57, 61
28 For description of estimation method, see World Development Indicators (2002a) Table 2.8 (About the data). 
29 The length of time between two observations with the same income concept within a country ranges from 2 to 14 
years with a median of 4 years in our sample.
30 We prefer to use regional dummy variables in the adjustment regressions since we have only 371 observations and 
eight different income definitions which are not equally distributed among regions. While category family and equivalized 
are only relevant for industrial countries, category income (unknown tax treatment) and net income are only present in 
three out of five regions in developing countries. If we omit regional dummy variables, the coefficients of these income 
definitions may falsely capture also regional differences in inequality. Since we only subtract the estimated coefficients 
of the income definitions from the unadjusted income inequality measures, regional differences in inequality are not 
consumed away by this adjustment procedure. To check this issue further, we also run adjustment regressions without 
regional  dummy  variables.  If  we  compare  correlations  of  the  two  adjusted  first/second  quintile  shares  and  Gini 
coefficients  with  its unadjusted  version, the correlation coefficients for the adjustment process  with regional dummy 
variables are always closer to one confirming our approach. 
31 Subtracting the estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures means that 
we calculate the adjusted measures by subtracting the alternative income dummies multiplied by its coefficient from the 
unadjusted first/second quintile and Gini coefficients. On critic of this adjustment procedure, see Atkinson/Brandolini 
(2001).12
PPP-adjusted real income per capita (constant 1996 US dollars using the chain index) reported 
in the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston/Summers/Aten 2002, Heston/Summers 1991). 
Though  the  mean  income  from  national  accounts  may  differ  from  mean level  of  household 
income  (expenditure)  due  to  measurement  errors,  income  definition,  or  underestimation  of 
income  (consumption)  in  developing  countries  caused  by  nonparticipating  rich,  we  use  per 
capita GDP.
32
3.2  Classifications of exchange rate regimes and descriptive statistics
The analysis of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth needs to take 
into  account  some  important  issues.  First,  even  if  exchange  rate  regimes  in  developing 
countries might have evolved towards more flexibility since the decline of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973, de facto a wide variety of managed rates is predominant in developing and 
transitional countries in contrast to more flexible exchange rate regimes or monetary unions in 
industrial countries (World Economic Outlook 1997, Agénor/Montiel 1999, Johnston et al. 1999, 
Mussa/Masson/Swoboda/Jadresic/Mauro/Berg  2000,  Reinhart/Rogoff  2003,  Husain/Mody 
/Rogoff 2004). Thus the empirical analysis of the optimal arrangement can be impeded by the 
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32 One  pragmatic  reason  is  that  the  UNU/WIDER-UNDP  Database  does  not  indicate  the  mean  level  of  household 
income for each household survey. For a discussion of applying this procedure in pro-poor growth regressions, see 
Eastwood/Lipton (2001), Dollar/Kraay (2001). For a further discussion of discrepancies between national accounts and
household survey measures of living standards, see Ravallion 2001a). 13
exchange rates (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997, Edwards/Savastano 1999, Johnston et al. 1999, 
Bubula/Ötker-Robe  2002,  Reinhart/Rogoff  2003,  Husain/Mody/Rogoff  2004).
33 Ignoring 
completely the old official IMF classification, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002b) use the volatility 
of the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of its rate of change and the volatility of international 
reserves (indicator for the extent of foreign exchange intervention) to group annual exchange 
rate regimes of all 183 IMF reporting countries for the period 1974 –                          
            
34 Combinations of high and low volatility of the three indicators result in a 5-way-
classification (flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, fixed, inconclusives).
35
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classify exchange rate regimes of 153 countries for the period 1946-
2001 by incorporating monthly data on market-determined (dual, multiple or parallel) exchange 
rates and chronologies of the history of exchange rate arrangements and related factors, i.e. 
exchange  controls  and  currency  reforms.
36 Using  a  similar  nomenclatura  as  the  new  IMF 
classification (January 1999), the resulting fine classification now comprises fifteen categories.
37
Due to limited availability of data in our sample, however, we use a more coarse classification 
which condenses the fifteen categories to six by merging the categories.
38 In their approach, 
Reinhart/Rogoff  (2003)  construct  a  new category  freely falling by  two  criteria. First, the  12-
month inflation rate exceeds 40 percent unless  some form of pre-announced peg or narrow 
band have been identified. Second, the six months immediatly following a currency crisis are 
classified as freely falling only if the crisis has taken place by a sudden change from pegs to 
managed  or  independently floating regimes.
39 Classifying  this  new  category,  freely falling  is 
justified by the reason that macroeconomic instability could be incorrectly attributed to pegged, 
intermediate  or  floating  exchange  rate  regimes,  i.e. exchange  rate  regimes  would  have  no 
indepedent  influence  on  macroeconomic  outcome  due  to  severe  economic  disturbances 
(Husain/Mody/Rogoff  2004).  However,  since  category  freely falling  is  not  an  exchange  rate 
regime of voluntary choice and thus currency crises are not correctly attributed to the chosen de 
facto exchange rate arrangement, estimation results for the exchange rate categories may be 
misleading. To cover this issue, we also test a reduced 4-way classification replacing freely 
33 The difference in official statement and actual management of exchange rate regimes can be caused for example by 
the political costs of announcing devaluations (Bubula/Ötker-Robe 2002). Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) state that the old 
IMF classification is almost random with respect to their reclassification. 
34 Using a calendar year as unit of account, the exchange rate regime classified is a combination of different official 
arrangements in case of changes during the year. 
35 Flexible: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, high volatility of its rate of change, low volatility of international 
reserves. Dirty float: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, high volatility of its rate of change, high volatility of 
international reserves. Crawling peg: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, low volatility of its rate of change, 
high  volatility  of international reserves. Fixed: low  volatility  of the  nominal  exchange rate, low  volatility  of its rate  of 
change, high volatility of international reserves. Inconclusives: low volatility of all three indicators.
36 The chronologies are used to sort out countries with dual, multiple or parallel exchange rates. While the exchange 
rate  regime  of  countries  with  unified  exchange  rates  is  classified  by  the  volatility  of  the  official exchange  rate,  the 
volatility  of the  market-determined (dual,  multiple,  parallel)  exchange rate classifies the  exchange rate regime if the 
parallel market premium is consistently 10 percent or higher. 
37 On  the  correspondance  between  the  IMF  de  jure  classification  and  the Reinhart/Rogoff  2003  classification,  see 
Husain/Mody/Rogoff (2004).
38 Pegged: no separate legal tender, pre announced peg, currency board or horizontal band (between +/-2 %), de facto 
peg.  Limited  flexibility:  Pre  announced  crawling  peg  or  band  (between  -/+  2  %),  de  facto  crawling  peg  or  band 
(between -/+ 2 %). Managed floating: Pre announced crawling band (more than or equal to -/+ 2 %), de facto crawling 
band (between -/+ 5 %), Moving band (between -/+ 2%), Managed floating. Freely floating. Freely falling. Category 6: 
Dual market with missing data on parallel markets.14
falling by one of the four categories as indicated in the chronologies (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003).
40
Critic on  both  the  LYS  and RR  classifications  can  be based  on  its reliance on  quantitative 
analysis of exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves, which may lead to false inferences 
about the exchange rate regime (Bubula/Ötker-Robe 2002).
41
In table 4 we present a two-way table of the frequency of the exchange rate regimes between 
the  LYS  and  RR  classification,  to analyze  the  comparability  of both  exchange  rate  regime 
classifications. While pegged regimes (hard pegs) and freely floating in RR coincide mainly with 
fixed  and  flexible  regimes  in  LYS,  respectively,  fixed  and  flexible  regimes  in  LYS  are  not 
exclusively associated with pegs and freely floating in RR, respectively, but are also frequently 
present in limited flexibility and managed floating.
42 In addition, freely falling is not confined to 
one exchange rate regime in the LYS classification, but almost equally distributed among the 
different  arrangements.  Thus  the  frequency  table  emphasizes  the  significant  difference  in 
classifying exchange rate arrangements between both approaches. 
Finally, we have a look at descriptive statistics to reveal some important prior results. In table 5 
we present the mean of the average annual growth for the unadjusted first and second quintile 
share  for  each  initial  exchange  rate  arrangement,  comparing  the  LYS  and  both  RR 
classifications. First, observations for inconclusives and category 6 (dual market with missing 
data on parallel market) are very limited and often misleading, thus we omit both categories in 
the regressions. Second, while in the LYS classification we have 22 observations with flexible 
exchange rate regimes in the developing countries, there is no observation for category freely 
floating for developing countries in the coarse RR classification. On the other hand, we have 18 
observations for freely falling, a category only present in developing and transitional countries. 
Observations for transitional countries, however, are very limited and the mean of the average 
annual  growth  for  both  quintile  shares  is  almost  always  highly  negative  compared  to  other 
regions.
43 Concerning the 4-way RR classification, freely falling is attributed mainly to managed 
floating and freely floating in both developing and transitional countries. Third, regarding the 
sign  and  size  of the  means  in  the  LYS  classification,  the  regime  dirty  float  is  considerably 
positive  for  all  countries  compared  to  other  arrangements  if  we  omit  the  highly  negative 
observation  for transitional  countries  (Poland  1990/93).  This  result  is  mainly  driven  by  nine 
observations in developing countries. In addition, fixed regimes are negatively correlated with 
the  mean  of  the  growth  rate  of  both  the  first  and  second  quintile  in  all  and  developing 
39 Currency  crises  are  defined  by  a  monthly  depreciation  above  twelve  and  one-half  percent  and  if the  preceding 
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40 Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) provide also the underlying arrangement for freely falling in the chronologies, assuming that 
there would be no knowledge of the inflation rate. In addition, since category freely falling is only present in transitional 
and developing countries in our sample, estimations for industrial countries have not to be retested. 
41 For example the behavior of the exchange rate is not only affected by exchange rate policy. 
42 These results hold even if we use the 4-way classification replacing freely falling by other exchange rate arrangments 
(Reinhart/Rogoff 2003) (table 4).
43 The exception managed floating (pre-announced crawling peg, moving band and managed floating) is only dependent 
on  observations  from  Hungary  mostly  during  the  communist  era  (1972/77,  77/82,  82/87,  89/93)  and  thus  do  only 
marginally reflect the effect of the transitional process on the first and second quintile share. For reasons of widening 
inequality in transitional countries, see Grün/Klasen (2001).  15
countries.
44 Furthermore, the growth rates of flexible regimes (LYS) or freely floating (RR) are 
negatively correlated for both quintile shares in industrial countries, which also indicate negative 
means  for  all  countries  in  the  RR  classification  (-0.58,  -0.85).  Finally,  we  emphasize  the 
difference  between  the  coarse  and  4-way  RR  classification. While  category  freely falling  is 
highly positively correlated with the means for first and second quintile in developing countries, 
this  positive  effect  is  attributed  to  managed  floating  and  freely  floating  in  the  reduced 
classification.
45
In table 6 we present the means of the adjusted first and second quintile share of income for 
each exchange rate regime comparing the LYS and RR classifications. We now have more 
observations since we look at the correlation between the levels of adjusted first/second quintile 
share  and exchange  rate  arrangements.  Again, we  omit observations  for inconclusives  and 
category 6 in our regressions due to limited availability and often misleading size. Furthermore, 
we now have two observations in category freely floating for developing countries in the coarse  
RR classification with high values (Indonesia 1999, Madagascar 1999). In general, the means in 
the  transitional  countries  are  high  in  both  classifications  compared  with  developing  and 
industrial  countries,  illustrating  the  influence  and  legacy  of  the  communist  era.  While  there 
seems to be no important difference of the means in the LYS classification, freely falling is 
considerably lower for developing countries in the coarse RR classification, a result lessened for 
all countries due to the high means of freely falling in transitional countries. Looking a the 4-way 
RR classification, freely falling is again attributed mainly to managed floating and freely floating 
in both developing and transitional countries. While this change is not relevant for the means in 
all countries, the values for freely floating are considerable diminished for developing countries 
in the reduced RR classification. 
To look additionally on the total effect, we finally present the means of the average annual 
growth of mean income of the first/second quintile and the means of the mean income of the 
adjusted first/second quintile for the different exchange rate arrangements (table 7 and 8).
46 In 
industrial and developing countries the growth rate of the mean income of first/second quintile is 
almost always higher than the growth rate of the first/second quintile (compare table 7 to 5). 
Even if dirty float remains considerably positive for all countries with respect to other regimes in 
the  LYS  classification,  crawling  pegs  and  flexibles  become  also  important  for  developing 
countries (table 7). And again, fixed regimes exhibit the lowest growth rates for the poorest 40 
percent in developing countries.
47 We find a similar result for pegged regimes in the coarse RR 
classification for developing countries. While the growth rates of limited flexibility and managed 
44 The positive effect of the fixed regime for the growth rate of the first quintile becomes negative in all countries (-0.34) 
and the negative effect in developing countries diminishes (-0.73) if we omit an incredible high growth rate for the first 
quintile in Senegal 1991 –              
45 In all countries the small positive effect of freely falling is mainly attributed to managed floating since freely floating 
becomes  more  negative  in  the  4-way  RR  classification,  i.e.  the  highly  negative  values  of  transitional  countries  are 
labelled as freely floating in the reduced RR classification..
46 For the difference between distribution effect and total effect, see section 4. 16
floating here are not lower with respect to freely falling in developing countries, freely falling is 
again positively correlated with the means for growth rate of the mean income of the first and 
second  quintile in developing  countries  (compare  table  7  to  5). This  positive  effect is  again
attributed to freely floating and managed floating in the 4-way classification, resulting in low 
positive growth rates for freely floating in developing countries. Looking at table 8, the means of 
dirty float are considerably higher than in other regimes for developing countries in the LYS 
classification. In addition, freely falling is the category with the lowest means for all countries in 
the  coarse  RR  classification,  a  result  not  comfirmed  in  developing  countries.  While  limited 
flexibility remains the exchange rate regime with the highest means for developing countries in 
the 4-way RR classification, the values for freely floating in all countries are diminished by the 
highly  negative  values  for  freely  floating  in  transitional  countries  in  the  reduced  RR
classification.       
3.3   Data on additional macroeconomic variables
Data sources and definitions of additional macroeconomic variables are presented in table 3. As 
we confront missing values and outliers, the number of observations vary for each variable and 
restrict the size of the sample due to the econometric specification. In addition, not all additional 
macroeconomic variables are used in all specifications due to insignificant coefficients. 
The  variables  overall  budget  surplus  to  GDP  and  government  consumption  to  GDP  are 
controlled for. Budget deficit is expected at least to not have negative coefficients, as better 
public finances should not decrease pro-poor growth. The impact of government consumption, 
however, is ambiguous, as benefits of public sector not necessarily support the poorest part of 
an economy more than other income groups.
48 In addition, government size can also negatively 
impact on the income of the poor due to distortions of private decisions and its proxy for bad 
governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). Unfortunately, we could not test the impact of health 
and education expenditures to GDP on pro-poor growth due to lacking data availability for our 
sample.
49 Human capital may play a crucial role for the income of the poor, thus we use the 
average years of secondary schooling in the total population aged 25 and over as proxy for 
investment in education with expected positive coefficients.
50 We also include life expectancy as 
a proxy for investment in health with expected positive effect. 
47 The positive effect of the fixed regime for the growth rate of the mean income of the first quintile diminishes to +1.27 in 
all countries and to +0.70 in developing countries if we omit the incredible high growth rate of the mean income of the 
first quintile for Senegal 1991 –               
48                                                                                                                       
                                   
49 Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit (2003) collect data  on  education  and health  expenditures for  81 countries for the 
period 1960 to 2000. Even if the dataset is accessible (which is not the case), it would be inconvenient for our purposes 
as only less than half of the countries are present in our sample. 
50 We also experimented with three other education indicators (average years of schooling in total population aged 25 
and over, a                                                                                         “                 
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The  rate  of  inflation  is  used  to  cover macroeconomic  uncertainty  effects  and  to  control for 
inflationary financial effects on pro-poor growth. Low levels of inflation are expected to stimulate 
or  at least  not  hinder  pro-poor  growth,  while  high  or crisis levels  of  inflation  should  impact 
negatively  on  pro-poor  growth.  Furthermore,  we  use  terms-of-trade  to  capture  external 
environmental  effects  with  expected  positive  impact  (Barro/Sala-i-Martin  1995, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).
51 We also controll for financial development measured by M2 to 
GDP ratio with expected positive coefficient. A positive impact of financial sector development 
on  the  poor  may  be  reasoned  by  better  access  to  credit  and  improved  risk  sharing 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). 
Furthermore, the initial value of the adjusted Gini coefficient is added to cover the impact of 
initial inequality on the growth of the mean income of the poor with expected positive coefficient. 
Adding the initial inequality in the growth equation can be motivated by testing the hypothesis of 
inequality convergence. A positive coefficient for the initial Gini coefficient would confirm the 
convergence of inequality (Ravallion 2000). Finally, civil liberties are used to test institutional 
effects on the poor. The index is measured on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the 
most liberal state. Thus the coefficient should be negative, if less civil liberties result in anti-poor 
growth and policies. 
4. Pro-poor growth
Analytically,  the  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  on  the  income  of  the  poor  can  be 
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it:  first/second quintile share of income
Yit: real per capita income
51 Terms-of-trade growth reflects external shocks from world market orientation. The sign of the coefficient, however, 
may be indifferent as a positive terms-of-trade growth can improve the income of the poor representing for example an 
increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities (benefiting the rural poor) or a fall in the price for imported 
consumption goods (benefiting the urban poor). Otherwise, positive terms-of-trade growth can also decrease the income 
of the poor by adverse supply-side effects due to the shift in relative prices.
52 There is considerable ongoing discussion on the appropriate definition and measurement of pro-poor growth. While 
none  of the measures  proposed has so far set an international  accepted standard, both the growth effect  and  the 
distribution  effect  have  been  identified  as  most  critical  for  reduction  in  absolute  poverty  (Kakwani/Pernia  2000, 18
Exjit: dummy variable for exchange rate regimes 
with  j = 1, ... , 4 (LYS)
j = 1, ... , 5 (coarse RR)
j = 1, ... , 4 (4-way RR)
ρj: (equiproportionate)  growth  effect  of  exchange  rate  regime  on  mean 
income (∂     it)/∂   jit)
 α1- 1): distribution effect of mean income (∂  
q20/40
it/∂     it))
γj: distribution effect of exchange rate regime (∂  
q20/40
it /∂   jit)
The  (equiproportionate)  growth  effect  (the first term on  the  right hand  side  of the  equation) 
                                                                ρj) with respect to a base 
group.
53 The distribution effect (second term in brackets) measures the impact of the exchange 
                                                                                    α1 and one 
                                              γj of the exchange rate regime EXjit on the first and 
second quintile share. Thus the income of the poor could be affected directly and indirectly 
through growth by exchange rate regimes and possible trade-offs of exchange rate regimes 
affecting  economic  growth  and  the  first/second  quintile  share  in  opposite  directions  can  be 
analyzed. 
A natural benchmark for pro-                                                  α1         γj = 
0, i.e. no distribution effects (equation (1): ∂  
p20/40
it / ∂    jit   ρj). Thus pro-poor growth could be 
defined by a distribution effect:
ρj      α1-      ρj  γj    ρj i.e. γj > 0 for α1 = 1 (2)
One drawback of defining pro-poor growth only by equation (2) is the fact, that a situation with a 
negative  growth  effect  (ρj < 0) would  also  be  labelled  as  pro-        γj > 0 In this  case  the 
exchange  rate  regime  would  affect  the  growth  rate  negatively (ρj <  0),  but  this effect  is 
diminished by an positive effect on the first/second quintile share     γj > -  α1-      ρj     ρj is 
                                                                                   γj must be 
greater than the                                   α1 > 1). To cover this issue, pro-poor growth 
could be defined by a total effect assuming ∂  
p20/40
it / ∂    jit > 0:
ρj    α1 -      ρj   γj] > 0 i.e.  γj > - ρj     α1 = 1 (3)
This condition would require a positive impact adding the growth and distribution effect, i.e. the 
positive impact of the exchange rate regime on first/second quintile share has to more than 
Anderson/White 2001, Bourguignon 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 2001, Kakwani/Son/Khandker 2003, 
Klasen 2003, Ravallion 2003).
53 As we outline in the next section we estimate the difference between a fixed exchange rate regime (our base group) 
and all other arrangements. Thus the growth and distribution effects of, for example, a flexible exchange rate regime 
have to be interpreted as positive or negative difference with respect to the fixed exchange rate regime. 19
offset the negative effect of the exchange rate regime through growth. On the other hand, a 
growth situation would be also labelled pro-poor, if the positive growth effect of an exchange 
rate regime exceeds its negative distribution effect.
In our approach we choose equation (2) and equation (3) as our pro-poor growth conditions, to 
cover both the distribution effect and the total effect of exchange rate regimes on the poorest 20 
and 20 to 40. We                                                α1-1, while often different from 
zero, is almost always insignificant in our regressions. Thus, assuming no indirect distribution 
                            α1= 1), pro-poor growth is defined in equation (2) by a positive 
                     γj > 0). In equation (3) pro-poor growth is achieved if the total effect of the 
distribution effect and growth effect is posi      γj   ρj > 0). Estimating both equations, possible 
trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth effect can be analyzed. If estimations for 
the distribution effect are positive (γj > 0), but the coefficients for the total effect           γj + ρj = 
0), we can conclude that the growth effect of exchange rate regimes on the income of the poor 
                    ρj < 0). If estimations for the distribution effect are negative (γj < 0) and the 
                      γj   ρj = 0), the growth effect of the openness indicator on the income of the 
                         ρj > 0).
5.   Econometric specifications and estimation
5.1   Econometric specifications
To measure the impact of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth we choose two different 
econometric methodologies, a system generalized method of moments estimation for a level 
and first-differenced equation and a growth equation using pooled OLS, random or fixed effects 
estimation. 
5.1.1   System GMM estimation: level and first differenced equation
To estimate the distribution effect we formulate the following ad hoc equation in levels, i.e. we 
regress the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent poorest on the mean income, exchange 
rate regime dummies, and variants of additional variables.
Y
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it:  first/second quintile share of income
Yit: real per capita income20
i: cross-section units (split or not split countries) 
t: year of observation
μi   εit: composite error term including unobserved country effects
Xkit: additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n 
Exjit: dummy variables for exchange rate regimes (base group omitted)
with  j = 1, ..., 4 (LYS) 
j = 1, ..., 5 (coarse RR)
j = 1, ..., 4 (4-way RR)








it = logarithm of first/second quintile share divided by 0.2
However, to include information on within-country variation and to cover econometric issues 
discussed in the next section we apply a system GMM estimator, i.e. we estimate the level 
equation  (5)  and  its first difference  (6) as  a  system with  the  restriction  of having  the  same 





it    α1-1)[ln(Yi,t+z) –     it    βk[Xki,t+z - Xkit   γj[EXji,t+z - EXjit      εit+z  - εit] (6) 
with 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income definition or
distance of years between observations within a country
To handle the incomparability problem of inequality data we choose two different routes. First, 
we  split the countries requiring the same income definition within each subgroup (e.g. Côte 
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income. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country (e.g. 
       ’                                                                                             
                                 
55 While in this case income definitions in the first-differenced 
and  level  equation  are  comparable, the  adjustment procedure  may  influence  the  estimated 
coefficients (Atkinson, Brandolini 2001). One general drawback of the system GMM estimation 
in our context, however, is the fact that we are confronted with irregular panel data, i.e. z ranges 
form 2 to 14 in both approaches. In the system GMM estimation, however, z is assumed to be 
identical in the first-differenced equation. 
The results of the system GMM estimation can be interpreted as a mixture of the level and first-
differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-section regression of the impact of the exchange rate 
regimes on the level of first/second quintile at certain country-year observations (5) and the 
impact of the change of the exchange rate regime on the change of the first/second quintile 
share (6) between the observations within a country.
56 Combining (5) and (6) in the system 
                                                               γj) and the additional regressors 
(βk                                                                     γj        γj < 0 indicates a 
pro- or anti-poor shift on average of the first/second quintile share associated with the chosen 
exchange rate regime j compared to the omitted exchange rat                   βk different from 
zero indicate pro-  βk > 0) or anti-  βk < 0) poor growth on average.
57 Interpreting the system 
GMM approach as a level equation the chosen exchange rate arrangement j would shift the 
first/second quintile share on avera      γj*100 percent with respect to the base group.
Finally, to estimate the total effect we regress the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent on exchange rate regimes and variants of additional regressors taking as level equation 




it   α0    βk ρk)Xkit    γj  ρj)Exjit    μi   εit (7)
                                       γj  ρj) > 0 indicate a pro-poor shift on average of the mean 
income of the first/second quintile share associated with the chosen exchange rate regime j 
                                                                             γj  ρj) < 0 would 
indicate anti-                                βk ρk different from zero indicate pro-  βk ρk > 0) or 
anti-  βk ρk < 0) poor growth (total effect). Trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth 
                                                                γj                        γj   ρj ) differ in 
sign. 
55 We  compare  the  values  of  the  adjusted  first  and  second  quintile  of  both  per  country  year  observations  (e.g. 
Venezuela  1987/1,  1987/2)  with  the  values  before  (Venezuela  1981)  and  after  (Venezuela  1993)  the  country  year 
observations to decide whether we omit the first or second observation as ordered in table 1.  If one of the adjusted 
observation varies considerably with respect to the other observations, we omit this observation.  
56 In the first-differenced equation the exchange rate variables have three values (1, 0 –                             
                                                                                                           
57                                                 α1 –       α1 –                                                           
                                                                            it). 22
5.1.2   Growth equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects estimation
To measure also within-country variation, to cover the problem of an irregular panel in the first-
differenced equation and the incomparability issue of income inequality measures, we also use 
a  growth  equation forming  the  dependent  variable  exclusively  from  spells  with  identical 
definitions  of inequality  income  measures  and  divide  the  growth  rates  of  each  spell  by  the 
distance of years to calculate (regular) annual averages. Thus we regress the annual average 
growth rate of the mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 per cent poorest on the annual average 
growth rate of mean income and initial values for dummy variabels of exchange rate regimes 
and additional macroeconomic variables. 
y
p20/40




it: average annual rate of growth of the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent 
poorest defined as 100/z*[ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) –     
20/40
i,t+z t*Yit/0.2)]
z: distance  of years  between  two  observations  of a spell  with identical income 
definition
yit: average annual rate of growth of the mean income defined as
100/z*[ln(Yi,t+z) –     it)]
Xkit: additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n; only initial values (at beginning of spell) 
Exjit: dummy variables for exchange rate regimes (base group omitted)
with  j = 1, ..., 4 (LYS) 
j = 1, ..., 5 (coarse RR)
j = 1, ..., 4 (4-way RR)
only initial values (at beginning of spell)
uit error term of unknown form 
We subtract yit from both sides in (8) to derive the distribution effect more clearly:
y
q20/40




it: average annual rate of growth of the first and second quintile share defined as 
100/z* [ln(Q
20/40









it –  it =  100/z* ([ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) –     
20/40
it *Yit/0.2)] - [ln(Yi,t+z) –     it)])
=  100/z* ([ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z) + ln(Yi,t+z) –        
      
20/40
it) - ln (Yit) + ln (0.2)
- ln(Yi,t+z)  + ln(Yit)])
=  100/z* [ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z) –     
20/40
it)]23
      γj      βk > 0  indicate pro-poor growth (positive distribution effect) with respect to (2), i.e., 
first, the average annual growth rate of the first and second quintile share with exchange rate 
                       γj percentage points higher than the base group and, second, a one 
percentage point increase of the additional variables would increase the average annual growth 
                                           βk percentage points.
60




it   α0    βk ρk)Xkit   γj  ρj)EXjit +  uit (10)
                                   γj  ρj) > 0 indicates that the average annual growth rate of the 
mean  income  of  the  first/second  quintile  with  exchange  rate  regime  j                  γj ρj
percentage points higher than the omitted exchange rate                                        γj+ 
ρj) < 0 would indicate an anti-                                βk ρk different from zero indicate 
pro-  βk ρk > 0) or anti-  βk ρk < 0) poor growth (total effect). Again, trade-offs between the 
                                                                                               γj) and 
                  γj   ρj ) differ in sign.
5.2 Econometric issues
In  estimating  variants  of  equations  (5), (6),  and  (9)  several  econometric  issues  have  to  be 
mentioned.
62 First, if we estimate the level equation (5) alone by pooled OLS, coefficients would 
be  biased  and  inconsistent  due  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  correlated  with  regressors 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 1997). Fixed-effect or first-difference 
estimation  in  a  panel  data  framework  would  be  standard  remedies  to  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity issue. However, within-country variation of income distribution may be too limited 
compared  to  the  greater  variability  of  first  and  second  quintile  shares  across  countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001). Thus  we apply a system GMM estimator using both information on the 
levels  (cross-country  variation)  and  first-difference  (within-country  variation)  of  income 
distribution data (Arellano/Bover 1995, Blundell/Bond 1998). Estimating the growth equation (9) 
by  pooled  OLS,  the  estimated  coefficients  might  also  be  biased  and  inconsistent  due  to 
unobserved country-                    εit. We use both a Hausmann test for fixed and random 
effects and a Breusch Pagan Langrange multiplier test for random effects to cover this issue. If 
we  can  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  in  both tests  pooled  OLS is  the  appropriate  method. 
Otherwise, we present results for random effects (the Breusch Pagan test is rejected, but not 
the Hausmann test) or fixed effects model (the Hausmann test is rejected).    
60                                                 α1 –       α1 –                                                           
                                              it.
61                                 α1 equals one.
62 The discussion in this section is also relevant for regressions on the total effect (equations 7 and 10).24
Second,  even  if  time-invariant  country-specific  effects  can  probably  be  dismissed,  omitted 
variable bias might be an issue due to variables whose values change over time. In addition, as 
the econometric specification is not based on a comprehensive theoretical framework, but more 
found in ad hoc considerations and plausible reasoning, model uncertainty problems might arise 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides  2002).
63 Thus  excluded  variables  might  be  correlated  with  the 
regressors leading to biased estimates. 
Third, measurement error in dependent and independent variables could generate biases in the 
estimated coefficients. While measurement error in the data on first/second quintile might be 
more severe due to flawed inequality data, measurement error in the dependent variable only  
causes  biases  in  case  of  systematic  correlation  with  regressors  (Wooldridge  2000).
64
Measurement  error  in  explanatory  variables,  however,  might lead  to  inconsistent  estimates. 
Varying  definitions  and  accuracy  in data  collection, for example,  cause  measurement  errors 
especially present in data on developing countries.
65
Fourth, in  estimating  level  and  first  difference  equations  (5),  (6)  or  the  growth  equation  (9) 
simultaneity might be an issue.
66 In case of reverse causation, estimations would be biased and 
inconsistent.  While  the  choice  of  exchange  rate  regimes  may  depend  on  a  broad  set  of 
variables, the (growth rate of the) first and second quintile income, however, is not proposed in 
the  literature  (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf  1997 Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  2001,  2002a).  In 
addition,  the  impact  of  the  (growth  rate  of)  first/second  quintile  income  on  additional 
macroeconomic variables (X) is controversially discussed. While, on the one hand, endogeneity 
is denied due to pragmatic reasons (Dollar/Kraay 2001), reverse causation may be argued for 
because of major policy and institutional changes in developing countries and political economy 
reasons  (Lundberg/Squire  2001).  We do  not  instrument  for  EX  and  X  in  the  system  GMM 
estimations  due  to  limited  data  availability  and  plausibility.
67 In addition,  we  use  only  initial 
63 The problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty are connected by the exclusion of significant explaining 
regressors which might be correlated with the selected regressors. But while the omitted variable issue points to the 
inconsistent estimation of the selected parameters, the problem of model uncertainty focuses on the misspecification of 
the general model and the problem in explaining pro-poor growth by a single ad hoc model. On the problem of model 
uncertainty  in cross-country growth regressions, see Temple (1999). On the  issue  of model uncertainty in  pro-poor 
growth regressions with macroeconomic policy variables, see Ghura/ Leite/ Tsangarides (2002).
64 As y
p20/40 is formed by y, i.e. the dependent variable is systematically related to an explanatory variable, a  biased 
coefficient of y may be expected. However, remembering y
q20/40 in equation (5) this is equal to state that the growth rate 
of the first/second quintile must be correlated with the growth rate of mean income. As the data on first/second quintile 
and mean income stem from different sources, this can not be assumed in advance (Dollar/Kraay 2001). On the issue of 
biased estimates in case of identical data sources, see Chen/Ravallion (1997). 
65 On the measurement error problem in cross-section growth regressions and on the flawed data in the Penn World 
Table, see Temple (1999).
66 On  the  problem  of  simultaneous  examination  of  inequality  and  growth  and  their  joint  determinants,  see 
Lundberg/Squire (2001).
67 One could use lagged values of X and EX as instruments. However, as our sample is often restricted to only two 
observations per country, we would have to omit all these countries from the regression. The problem of endogeneity is 
reduced in the RR classification since longer-term regimes are indentified by a rolling five-year horizon. This approach 
leads to a relatively long durability of the classified exchange rate regimes (Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004). 25
values  for the  regressors  X  and  EX in each  spell  to  avoid endogeneity  due  to explanatory 
variables in the growth equation.
68
A significant impact of the (growth rate of the) mean income of the poor on the (growth rate of 
the) mean income might also be possible.
69 Considering equations (5), (6), and (9), reverse 
causation thus means impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile share on the (growth 
rate  of  the)  mean  income.
70 Using  only  a  level  equation  (5),  contemporaneous  reverse 
causation will cause inconsistent OLS estimation, while lagged reverse causation would justify 
OLS  estimation  assuming  serial  independence.  Thus  considering  the  growth  equation  (9), 
pooled  OLS  estimation  is  unbiased  and  consistent  if  lagged  reversed  causation  can  be 
assumed  with  serial  independence  (Eastwood/Lipton  2001).  Concerning  the  system  GMM 
estimation, reverse causation is covered in using instruments for mean income. In the level 
equation (5), we instrument for mean income using accumulated growth in mean income over 
three years prior to time t (e.g. Brazil 1967 to 1970 for 1970). In the first difference equation (7), 
we instrument for growth in mean income using the level of mean income at the beginning of the 
period,  and  accumulated  growth  in  the  three  years  prior  to  time  t  (Dollar/Kraay  2001, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).
71 A Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions is used to test for 
validity of extra instruments (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998). As the coefficient for 
(the growth rate of the) mean income is one in most of the cases, however, we present only 
results omitting (the growth rate of the) mean income.
Assuming lagged reverse causation of y
q20/40 on y in the growth equation (9), serial correlation in 
the  error  term within  countries  and  over  time  remains  to  be  discussed.  In  static  models, 
autocorrelation  in  the  error  term  leads  to  incorrect  standard  errors  and  t-ratios  but  not  to 
inconsistent estimates in OLS estimation. Serial correlation in models with lagged endogenous 
variables, however, would result in inconsistent estimates. Given a serially correlated error term 
the structure of the variance-covariance matrix for equation (9) would be block diagonal with a 
separate  block for each  country. Thus  off-diagonal  elements  would  only be  non-zero  within 
these blocks (Chen/Ravallion 1997). As different surveys are used within almost each block, the 
error term is assumed to be serially independent. Considering the system GMM estimator, the 
assumption of no serial correlati                     εit in the level equation (5) is essential for 
consistency (Bond/Blundell 1998). Thus tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
of the first-                      εit+z  - εit of equation (6) are reported. If disturbanc   εit are not 
                                                                                   εit+z  - εit have to be 
68 On this solution, see Lundberg/Squire (2001). On the empirical application of this method to deal with the endogeneity 
issue in cross-section growth regressions, see Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). But even in this solution endogeneity might 
remain a problem, see Temple (1999).
69 Biased estimates might also be possible due to joint causation (Timmer 1997, Eastwood/Lipton 2001). 
70 The  effect  of initial  income  inequality  on subsequent growth has  been  often  empirically  examined. The  evidence, 
however, is mixed with negative (Perotti 1996, Alesina/Rodrik 1994), positive (Forbes 2000, Li/Zou 1998) and indifferent 
effect  of  initial  income inequality  on  future  growth  (Deininger/Squire  1998b).  In  addition,  a  negative  effect  only  for 
countries with mean income below $ 2000 (in constant 1985 purchasing power) was found (Barro 2000).
71 Example: given the first difference equation Brazil 1960 –                                                     
                                                                                                              .26
significant negative (m1) and second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals 
insignificant (m2) (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998). 
5.3 Estimation strategy and results
To measure the impact of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth and to cover the issues 
mentioned  above  with  respect  to  correct  classifications  of  exchange  rate  regimes  and 
econometric  specifications,  we  test  two  classifications  (5-way  classification:  Levy-
Yeyati/Sturzenegger  2002b  (LYS),  coarse  classification:  Reinhart/Rogoff  2003  (RR))  in  both 
econometric approaches using fixed (LYS) and pegged (RR) regimes (no separate legal tender, 
pre-announced peg, currency board or horizontal band between +/-2%) as base group. We omit 
inconclusives (LYS) and category 6 (RR) due to limited observations in these categories and 
their biasing effect in our sample (table 5 to 8). Econometric specifications are tested for all, 
developing and industrial countries separately.
72
We estimate the different effects of exchange rate regimes in specifications without additional 
regressors, with regional dummy variables and with sets of additional macroeconomic variables. 
To  analyze  potential  trade-offs  between  the  distribution  effect  and  the  growth  effect  we 
additionally test the total effect of exchange rate regimes on the mean income of the 20 and 20 -
40  percent  poorest  adding  macroeconomic  variables.  Due  to  our  fundamentally  empirical 
approach, we execute different robustness checks to confirm the results, i.e. we test results 
without outliers, with mean income and with both adjusted and unadjusted inequality income 
measures  in  the  system  GMM  estimations.
73 Finally,  we also  use  a  reduced  4-way  RR 
classification in which category freely falling is assigned to one of the other four categories as 
denoted in the chronologies (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003).   
5.3.1 Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth: distribution effect
First, we estimate the effect of exchange rate regimes on the first and second quintile share 
without  additional  regressors.  In  table  9  we  compare  the  results  for  the  growth  equation 
denoting  the  exchange  rate  regimes  in  an  ascending  order  from more fixed  (crawling  peg, 
limited flexibility) to flexible regimes. In the LYS classification only dirty floats have a significant 
impact  (equations  2, 10,  19,  20).
74 This  effect  is  significantly  positive for developing  and  all 
countries if we omit outliers (equations 2, 10), i.e. countries with a dirty float regime have a 2.40 
percentage points higher annual average growth rate of the first quintile share with respect to 
72 We did not test transitional countries separately due to limited data availability. 
73 We indentify outliers from graphical analysis and descriptive statistics without a strict rule. We analyze outliers for our 
dependent  variables  with respect to the  whole sample  of  each  exchange rate  regime classification  and within  each 
exchange rate regime (i.e. we also omit the incredible high growth rates of Guinea 1991 - 94, Kenya 1992 - 94, and 
Senegal 1991 –                                                                                                           
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the base group fixed regime (equation 10).
75 The positive impact of the dirty float regime on the 
second  quintile  in  industrial  countries  (equations  19,  20),  while  robust  to  outliers,  is  not 
significant for all countries. However, as only 2 out of 11 observations (Italy 1987, Norway 1976) 
for dirty float regimes are from industrial countries (table 5), the effect on industrial countries is 
not very well supported. 
Concerning  the  RR  classification,  freely floating  and  freely falling  are  statistically  significant 
exchange  rate  regimes. While category freely floating  is  only  present  in industrial  countries,
freely  falling  is  only  found  in  developing  (18  observations)  and  transitional  countries  (3 
observations,  table  5).  Significant  results  for  all  countries  (table  9  equations  6,  7,  8)  are 
therefore  driven  by  effects  in  these  subgroups  of  countries.  For  the  first  quintile  share,  the 
coefficient  of  freely falling is  significantly  positive  only  without  outliers.  We  estimate  a  2.88 
percentage points positive difference of the annual average growth rate of the first quintile share 
with respect to the base group (pegged regimes) for developing countries (table 9 equation 14). 
On the other hand, freely floating is significantly negative for industrial countries for the first 
quintile share (equations 21, 22), a result contrary to the belief of a positive impact of flexible 
exchange rate regimes. In addition, freely floating is also highly significantly negative for the 
second  quintile  share  for  industrial  and  all  countries,   -0.88  and  –                         
                                                                                                      
                  
76 If we replace freely falling in a reduced 4-way RR classification, however, no 
significant  effect  of  freely  floating  or  other  exchange  rate  regimes  could  be  confirmed  in 
regressions for all and developing countries (table 9 equations 25 to 32).     
In table 10 we present our estimates for the system GMM methodology.
77 We only indicate 
results  for  the  RR  classification  due  to  insignificant  results  for  the  LYS  classification.  As 
mentioned above, we estimate both an adjusted and unadjusted approach to cover the income 
incomparability issue. Estimations for the first and second quintile shares for all countries (table 
10 equations 1 to 4) indicate that coefficients change in both approaches.
78 Category freely 
falling now has a negative coefficient between -0.12 and -0.16 on the first quintile share and 
second  quintile share.  Interpreting the  system  GMM  approach  as  a  level equation,  the first 
quintile share in countries with freely falling exchange rate regimes is on average between 15 
and 16 percents lower than in countries with pegged regimes. While freely floating and limited 
flexibility are significantly positive with respect to pegged regimes, this result is not confirmed for 
the  first  quintile  share  in  the  unadjusted  approach.  Specification-tests  for the  system  GMM 
74 The  F-test  for  all  and  developing  countries  (equation  2,  10),  however,  indicates  no  overall  significance  of  the 
regressions.
75 The low and insignificant coefficient of 0.12 in equation 1 is suspected to depend mainly on Poland 1990, as table 5 
indicates (mean of average annual growth of first quintile share of income for transitional countries: -13.87). 
76 Initial values for spells: Norway 1979 - 84, Denmark 1992 –    
77 Coefficients, heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors and tests on first-order and second-order serial 
correlation are based on the one-step estimator. While the one-step estimator is asymptotically inefficient relative to the 
two-step estimator, asymptotic inference based on the one-step estimator is supposed to be more reliable indicated by 
simulations. However,  a Sargan-test  would  be  only based  on the  two-step  estimator (Blundell/Bond  1998, see  also 
Bond/Hoeffler/Temple 2001).28
estimator, however, require significant negative first-oder serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals (m1) and no evidence for second-order correlation (m2), which is only fulfilled in the 
adjusted approach (table 10, equations 2 and 4).
Considering developing countries, the coefficient for freely floating is now highly positive on a 
one percent significance level (table 10 equations 5 to 8). Conclusions based on these results, 
however,  should  be  drawn  cautiously,  as  there  are  only  two  observations  (Indonesia  1999, 
Madagascar 1999) in the category freely floating in developing countries (table 5). In addition, 
limited flexibility is again significantly positive for the second quintile in the adjusted approach 
(table 10  equation  8). Furthermore,  the  coefficient  of  category  freely falling is  negative,  but 
insignificant in developing countries. Finally, only managed floating is significantly negative in 
industrial countries in the adjusted approach (table 10 equation 12). Again specification-tests on 
first-oder serial correlation are only passed in the adjusted approach (table 10, equations 6, 8, 
12). If we test the reduced 4-way RR classification, the significant coefficients for freely floating 
and  freely falling  disappear  in all and  developing  countries,  but findings  for limited flexibility 
remain significant and change only slightly in size (table 10 equations 13 to 20).  
In comparing results for the growth equation and level/first-differenced equation, four facts have 
to be emphasized. First, the positive effect of the dirty float regime (LYS) in the growth equation 
can not be confirmed in the system GMM estimation. Second, coefficients of limited flexibility 
(RR) are positive, but insignificant for all and developing countries in the growth equation. Third, 
the sign of the coefficients for category freely falling and freely floating differ in both econometric 
approaches for all countries (coarse RR). Finally, the coefficient of freely falling is negative, but 
insignificant for developing countries in the system GMM estimation (table 9 and 10). 
Explanation of these different findings should be based on the estimation methodology.
79 To 
reveal systematic differences of the estimation methodologies, we also estimate a sample used 
in the growth equation in a system GMM approach. As we need two observations with growth 
rates per country, i.e. three observations for the first and second quintile share, to apply the 
system GMM estimator, we dropped all countries with only two observations. Estimated results 
for the system GMM estimations are a mixture of the growth equation and the first difference of 
the growth equation. Second, we also tested effects of the level and first differenced equations 
78 The maximum difference of 0.054 between equation 3 and 4 is equivalent to a 5.4 percent difference for the second 
quintile share, for example from 0.080 to 0.084. 
79 The result of the system GMM estimation is a mixture of a level and first-differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-
section regression of the impact of exchange rate regimes on the level of first/second quintile and the impact of the 
change of the exchange rate regime on the change of the first/second quintile share. Concerning the level equation, a 
negative impact of freely falling on the first/second quintile share can be expected by its lower value with respect to 
other  categories in  all  countries  (table  6).  In  the first-differenced  equation  the  dummy  varibales  for  exchange  rate 
regimes have three values (1, 0, -1), which describe the change into a regime (1), no change of a regime (0), and the 
change out of a regime (-1) between time t and t+z. Thus a fall of first quintile between t and t+z with a change into 
category freely falling  would indicate  a  negative coefficient. In the growth  equation,  on the contrary,  we look  at  the 
impact of the exchange rate regime at time t on the growth of the first/second quintile between t and t+z . A positive 
effect of freely falling can then be interpreted as a higher growth of first quintile after a freely falling regime at time t. 
Thus the reversed signs of the freely falling coefficients may reflect a  u-turn shape of a freely falling situation, i.e. a 
downwards and upwards movement for first quintile share between time t-z, t and t+z with freely falling category at time 29
of  a  system  GMM  estimation  separately  in  OLS.  Estimated  coefficients  for  system  GMM 
estimation are here a mixture of a level equation and the first difference of the level equation. 
Thus the difference between the system GMM estimations and the growth estimations stems 
apparently from the fact that we regress the level of the first/second quintile on exchange rate 
regimes,  while  in  the  growth  equation  we  regress  the  growth  rate  on  initial  exchange  rate 
regimes.   
Next, we add regional dummy variables in our specifications to control for cultural, historical and 
economical  differences  of  income  inequality  in  the  six  regions  (Cornia  2002).  In  general, 
regional dummy variables are not important in the growth equation (table 11 equations 1 to 8). 
Exceptions  are  significant  negative  coefficients  for  Latin  America/Carribean  and  Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia in regressions for all countries (RR)                                           
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                         
                                                                                               
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                  
                                                                                  
                                                                                               
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                     
                                                         
80 Adding  regional  dummies  results  in 
insignificant and low coefficients for freely falling and freely floating in all countries (compare 
table  12  equations  1  to  4  with  table  10  equations  1  to  4).  Thus  the  high  values  for  both 
categories  in  regressions  without  regional  dummy  variables  stem  apparently  from  regional 
determinants different from exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, coefficients for freely 
floating remain highly significant and almost identical for developing countries (compare table 12 
equations 5 to 8 with table 10 equations 5 to 8). Concerning limited flexibility, coefficients for the 
second  quintile for all and  developing countries  remain significantly  positive in the  adjusted 
approach, but the coefficients are significantly lower (table 12 equations 4 and 8 compared with 
table 10 equations 4 and 8). Finally, category managed floating is now significantly positive to a 
10 percent level in first and second quintile regressions for all countries (table 12 equations 1 
and 3), a result not confirmed using adjusted income inequality measures. In addition, managed 
floating  is  also  significantly  positive  in  the  first  and  second  quinitle  share  for  developing 
countries, a result not present in regressions without regional dummy variables (compare table 
12 equations 5, 7, 8 with table 10 equations 5 to 8).
81 Again specification-tests on first-oder 
t (the bottom of a possible crisis). This hypothesis, however, would indicate that category freely falling is changed at the 
end of a spell, which could not confirmed in our sample.
80 Since  we  define  developing  countries  without  transitional  countries,  the  dummy  variable  for  Eastern  Europe  and 
Central Asia region is also omitted in regressions for developing countries. 
81 One exeception is the coefficient of managed floating for the first quintile share using the adjusted approach (table 12 
equation 6). 30
serial correlation are only passed in the adjusted approach (table 12, equations 2, 4, 6, 8). If we 
test the reduced 4-way RR classification, significant coefficients of freely floating for developing 
countries disappear. On the other hand, results for category managed floating do only slightly 
change (table 12 equations 9 to 16). Thus, while freely falling is often replaced by managed 
floating in the  4-way  RR  classification,  the  reclassification  does  no  affect the  coefficients  of 
managed floating.
82 Finally, limited flexibility is now only significantly positive for the second 
quintile in developing countries using the unadjusted approach (table 12 equation 7).
5.3.2  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth,  currency crises and capital controls: 
distribution effect 
Restrictions  on  capital mobility  are  seen  to be  a  critical variable in studying the  association 
between  exchange  rate  regimes  and  economic  growth  (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf  1997).
83 In 
addition, the choice of a reasonable exchange rate arrangement may differ for countries open to 
international  capital  mobility  and  countries  without  access  to  international  capital  markets 
(Fisher  2001,  Husain/Mody/Rogoff  2004).  To  test  this  hypothesis  with  respect  to  pro-poor 
growth, we additionally control for capital account liberalization in using a dummy variable for 
capital control based on various issues of the IMF Yearbook on Exchange Arrangement and 
Exchange Restrictions (table 3).
84 Batteries of regressions, however, could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no impact of capital restrictions on the first and second quintile shares.
85
Certain exchange rate regimes may be more prone to currency crisis than others (Bubula/Ötker-
Robe 2003).
86 But currency crises may also dependent on factors different from the type of 
exchange rate regimes (Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004, Razin/Rubinstein 2004). Without controlling 
for  currency  crises  we  so  far  assigned  these  effects  to  the  corresponding  exchange  rate 
arrangement.  To  control  the  shock  effects  of  currency  crises  on  pro-poor  growth,  we  use  a 
dummy variable indicating a currency crisis if an index of currency pressure, i.e. a weighted 
average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses, exceeds 
the  mean  plus  2  times  the  country-specific  standard  deviation (Glick/Hutchinson  1999). 
Concerning the growth equation, the additional currency crisis variable has never significant 
effect on pro-poor growth in the LYS classification, except for the negative coefficient of the 
second quintile share in industrial countries, an effect driven by two spells (table 13 equation 
1).
87 While this effect is also debatable due to the small sample size (N = 30), the positive effect 
of the dirty float regime is only slightly reduced from 1.32 to 1.19 (compare table 13 equation 1 
82 This result is in line with descriptive statistics since the means of adjusted first/second quintile in developing countries 
do not differ considerably for managed floating in both the coarse and the 4-way classification (table 6). 
83 For  an  overview  of  empirical  cross-country  studies  on  the  effect  of  capital  account  liberalization  on  economic 
performance, see Edison/Klein/Ricci/Sloek (2002). 
84 In the literature, several qualitative and quantitative indicators are proposed to measure capital account liberalization. 
For an overview and critic on each measure, see Edison/Klein/Ricci/Sloek (2002).
85 We  test  both  the  growth  equation  and  system  GMM  equation  for  all,  developing  and  industrial  countries  with 
exchange rate regimes, without outliers, with and without regional dummies for the LYS classification and the coarse 
and 4-way RR classification.
86 For  a  detailed  discussion  on  the  feasability  conditions  using  intermediate  exchange  rate  regimes  in  developing 
countries in the context of capital mobility and a broad discussion on causes of currency crisis, see Montiel (2003). 31
with table 9 equation 20). Looking at the coarse RR classification, the coefficient of the currency 
crisis dummy variable is also negative for second quintile shares in industrial countries, while 
the high statistical significance of the negative coefficient of freely floating disappears (compare 
table 13 equation 2 and table 9 equation 24).
88 Currency crises have an amazingly positive 
impact  on  the  growth  rate  of the  second  quintile  share  for  developing  countries  (table  13 
equation  4).  Exchange  rate  regimes,  however,  are  unimportant  and  the  F-test  on  overall 
significance is not passed. Using the coarse classification the shock variable is insignificant in all 
other specifications. If we test the 4-way RR classification, currency crises affect again positively 
the growth rate of second quintile share in developing countries (compare table 13 equations 6 
and 4). Finally, curreny crises impact now significantly positive on the growth rate of the first 
quintile share, while findings for limited flexibility remain similar and significant (compare table 
13 equations 5 and 3). Since the coefficient of currency crisis using the 4-way RR classiciation 
is  rather  similar to the  coefficient  of freely falling using  the  coarse  RR  classification  (+2.63, 
+2.79 respectively), the currency crisis variable seems to capture the effect so far attributed to 
freely falling.   
Looking  at  the  estimates  of  the  system  GMM  estimation,  currency  crises  impact  amazingly 
significantly  positive  on  the  second  quintile  share  for  all  and  industrial  countries  in  the  RR 
classification (table 14 equations 1, 5 and 6).
89 Interpreting the system GMM equation as level 
equation, a currency crisis would increase the level of the second quintile between 2.3 and 3.2 
percent in industrial countries. Controlling for currency crises, however, the limited flexibility and 
managed floating  regimes  now  are  significantly  negative for the  second  quintile in industrial 
countries using the unadjusted approach (compare table 14 equation 5 with table 10 equation 
11).  In addition, managed floating  becomes  insignificant  in the  unadjusted  approach  for the 
second quintile in all countries (compare table 14 equation 1 with table 12 equation 3). While 
currency  crises  are  insignificant  in  developing  countries,  categories  limited  flexibility  and 
managed floating now are also insignificant for the second quintile (table 14 equations 3 and 4 
compared  with  table  12  equations  7  and  8).  Finally,  if  we  test  the  reduced  4-way  RR 
classification in the system GMM estimation, currency crises and exchange rate regimes are 
never significant for all and developing countries.
5.3.3  Exchange  rate  regimes,  pro-poor  growth,  inflation  and  output  volatility: 
distribution effect
High  inflation  rates  may  negatively  affect  the  first  and  second  quintile  share  of  income 
(Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Dollar/Kraay 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). 
To test this hypothesis with respect to exchange rate regimes, we first add the inflation rate 
(logarithm of 1 plus the inflation rate) with exchange rate arrangements and regional dummy 
87 New Zealand 1986/89, Sweden 1981/87.
88 The Wald-test, however, indicates no overall significance of the regression.
89 The only exception is the regression for all countries using the adjusted approach (table 14, equation 2). We do not 
present results for regressions on the first quintile since the coefficient of currency crises is never significant. 32
variables  in  all  specifications.  While  inflation  is  not  relevant  with  respect  to  the  LYS 
classification,  the  coefficient  of  the  inflation  rate  is  amazingly  positive  at  a  ten  percent 
significance level in regressions of  the growth rate of the first quintile share on exchange rate 
regimes,  inflation  and  regional  dummy  variables  in  developing  countries  (coarse  RR 
classification, table 15 equation 1). If we test 4-way RR classification, inflation is again positive 
for the growth rate of the first and second quintile in developing countries (table 15 equations 3 
and 4).
90 The high coefficients for the inflation rate should not be misinterpreted, since only a 
one unit increase of ln(1+inflation/100) would raise the growth rate of the first quintile share for 
example  by  9.93  percentage  points  (table  15  equation  3).  In  our  sample  without  outliers, 
however, the values for ln(1+inflation/100) range only between -0.01 (-1.22 % inflation rate) and 
0.89  (143.61  %  inflation  rate). In  addition,  inflation  is  never  significant  in  the  system  GMM 
estimation, if we omit four outliers with extreme values (Belarus 1993: 1190 %, Belarus 1995: 
709 %, Brazil 1988: 651 %, Brazil 1993: 1997 % p.a.). 
We also test the direct impact of the inflation rate without exchange rate regimes. In the growth 
equation the coefficient of the inflation rate is amazingly positive for the growth rate of the first 
and second  quintile  in  developing  countries  (table  15  equations  5  and  6).
91 In  all  other 
regressions, however, inflation rate is never significant for both econometric approaches and all 
specifications  omitting  outliers.
92 Thus,  indirect  negative  effects  of  the exchange  rate 
arrangements through direct effects of the inflation rate on the first and second quintile share 
seem unlikely. In addition, a significant effect of inflation on the first quintile share could not be 
confirmed in the system GMM estimations omitting values of very high inflation, even if the 
coefficient of inflation rate is in general negative (Dollar/Kraay 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 
2002).
93
In addition, macroeconomic volatility may impact  negatively  on  the first and  second  quintile 
share. We add output volatility formed as three year moving standard deviation of annual real 
GDP  per  capita  growth  (for  example  Australia  1976:  standard  deviation  of  growth  rates  for 
Australia 1974, 75, 76, table 3) with exchange rate regimes and regional dummies in our basic 
equations. Output fluctuation, however, is almost never significant omitting outliers.
94 We also 
test  the  direct  effect  of  output  fluctuation  on  the  first  and  second  quintile  share  omitting 
exchange rate arrangments. The coefficient of output volatility, however, is never significant. To 
90 Wald-test on overall significance of the regression, however, is not passed for the growth rate of the second quintile 
(table 15 equation 4). We also find significant effect of inflation on the growth rate of the first quintile in all countries 
using the 4-way RR classification. Since Wald-test on overall significance is also not passed in this specification and 
other regressions indicate no significant impact of inflation for all countries, we do not present this result. 
91 Again, the Wald-test on overall significance of the regression is not passed for the growth rate of the second quintile 
(table 15 equation 6).
92 These results are in contrast to empirical evidence in the literature, which find significant negative impact of high 
inflation on the poor (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001). Romer/Romer (1998), however, do not adjust data on 
income inequality due to incomparability issues.  
93 While in Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides (2002), inflation is found to be significantly negative, results in Dollar/Kraay (2001) 
are similar to our estimates as the coefficients of inflation are insignificant.  
94 One  exception  is  a  small  positive  coefficient  (+0.007)  for  the  second  quintile  in  industrial  countries  using  the 
unadjusted approach in a system GMM estimation (coarse RR classication). However, this effect could not be confirmed 
in the adjusted approach and the test on first-order serial correlation indicates misspecifications.33
summarize, the effect of exchange rate regimes on the first and second quintile share seem not 
to work indirectly through output volatility.
5.3.4  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth and additional macroeconomic 
variables: distribution effect
Considering the empirical literature (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 
2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002), macroeconomic variables are found to be relevant with 
respect to pro-poor growth. In the growth equation we control for budget deficit to GDP, financial 
development  (money  and  quasi  money  to  GDP),  secondary  education  (average  years  of 
secondary schooling in total population aged 25 and over), inflation and initial Gini coefficient.
95
In the system GMM estimation we substitute budget deficit by government consumption due to 
its proven relevance in this estimation methodology (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). While the 
Gini coefficient is found to be highly significant in a similar approach (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 
2002), regressing the first quintile share on the Gini coefficient in a level/first-difference equation 
seems to us tautological as a change in inequality in the first and second quintile share is only 
explained  by  a  change  in overall inequality,  i.e. no  new  information  on  the  determinants  of 
inequality are added in this specification. Thus we omit the Gini coefficient in the system GMM 
estimations.
96
Looking  at  the  LYS  classification  in  the  growth  equation,  the  dirty  float  regime  is  now 
insignificant due to positive effects of budget surplus (compare table 16 equations 1 to 3 with 
table  9  equations  2  and  10),  but  the  F-test  of  overall  significance  could  not  be  rejected.
97
Coefficients for all other exchange rate regimes remain insignificant. Controlling for additional 
macroeconomic variables  in the  RR  classification,  the  effects  of exchange  rate  regimes  are 
changed considerably. While freely falling becomes insignificant in all and developing countries, 
now limited flexibility impacts significantly positive on the growth rate of the first quintile share 
(compare table 16 equations 5 and 7 with table 11 equations 5 and 7).
98 Coefficients for all other 
exchange  rate  regimes  remain  insignificant.  Concerning  the  macroeconomic  variables,  the
adjusted Gini coefficient impacts significantly positive on the growth rate of the second quintile 
in all and developing countries (table 16 equations 2, 4, 6, 8). Thus the hypothesis of inequality 
convergence  would  be  confirmed  by  these  results.
99 In  addition,  a  one  percentage  point 
increase  in budget  surplus  would  raise  the growth  rate of the first quintile  share  in all and 
95 Adding initial inequality in the growth equation can be justified by testing the hypothesis of inequality convergence 
even if usually the same inequality measure, i.e. Gini coefficient or first quintile share, is used on both sides of the 
equation  (Ravallion  2000).  A  positive  coefficient  for  the  initial  Gini  coefficient  would  confirm  the  convergence  of 
inequality.
96 We also omit M2 to GDP ratio due to insignificant results.
97 Tests for industrial countries fail due to limited observations (N = 19) and are not presented. 
98 The coefficient of limited flexibility remained significantly positive in regressions on the first quintile for developing 
countries (compare table 15 equation 7 with table 11 equation 7). In addition, tests for industrial countries fail due to 
limited observations (N = 28) and are not presented. 
99 One problem with these results are the high coefficients for the adjusted initial Gini coefficients, which are present 
only  in  fixed  effects  estimations  (table  16  equations  2  and  4).  However,  one  should  be  cautious interpreting  these 
findings,  since the coefficients of the constants are incredible highly negative. 34
developing countries between 0.22 and 0.30 percentage points (table 16 equations 1, 3, 7).
100
Finally, financial development affects significantly positive the growth rate of the first quintile in 
the coarse RR classification (table 16 equations 5 and 7). If we test the reduced 4-way RR 
classification,  the  significant  coefficients  for  limited  flexibility  disappear  (compare  table  16 
equations 9 and 11 with equations 5 and 7). Coefficients for all other exchange rate regimes 
remain  insignificant. While the  impact  of broad  money  to GDP becomes  insignificant, initial 
inequality  affects  now  also  positively  the  growth  rate  of  the  first  quintile  share  (table  16 
equations 9 to 12). 
Adding  government  consumption,  inflation,  and  secondary  education  to  the  exchange  rate 
regimes and regional dummies in a system GMM estimation, results for the coefficients of the 
exchange  rate  regimes  on  the  first  quintile  are  very  similar  to  the  regressions  without 
macroeconomic variables  (compare table 17 equations 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 with table 12 equations 
1,2, 5, 6, and table 10 equations 9, 10). Thus managed floating is significantly positive for the 
first quintile in all and developing countries using the unadjusted approach. However, none of 
the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables are significant in these regressions. Looking at 
the  findings  for  the  second  quintile,  managed  floating  remains  only  significantly  positive  in 
developing countries using the unadjusted approach (compare table 17 equations 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 
12 with table 12 equations 3, 4, 7, 8 and table 10 equations 11 and 12). While the coefficients of 
limited flexibility become insignificant (compare table 17 equations 4, 8 with table 12 equations 
4, 8), freely floating remain highly significantly positive in developing countries (compare table 
16 equations 5 to 8 with table 12 equations 5 to 8). Finally, freely floating now affects negatively 
the  second  quintile  in  industrial  countries  using  the  adjusted  approach  (compare  table  17 
equation 12 with table 10 equation 12). Coefficients of the macroceonomic variables, however, 
are insignificant in most of the cases.
101 While the size of the significant exchange rate regimes 
are lower, the general effect of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth remain unchanged, if 
we test the reduced 4-way classification (compare table 17 equations 13 to 20 with table 16 
equations 1 to 8). Finally, tests on first-order serial correlation are again passed only in the 
adjusted approach for all and developing countries, while specification tests fail completely for 
industrial countries.
5.3.5  Exchange  rate  regimes,  pro-poor  growth  and  additional  macroeconomic 
variables: total effect
Taking into account trade-offs between the distribution effect and the growth effect of exchange 
rate regimes on the income of the poor, we also test for the impact of both the LYS and RR  
classification on the mean income of the 20 and 20-40 percent poorest, i.e. the total effect. We 
100 One exception is the insignificant coefficient of budget surplus for the growth rate of the first quintile in the coarse RR 
classification for all countries (table 15 equation 5). 
101 Exceptions are the weakly positive coefficient of government consumption in  all and developing countríes for the 
second  quintile  using  the unadjusted  approach  (table  16  equations  3  and  7),  and  the  positive  effect  of  secondary 
education on the second quintile in industrial countries using the adjusted approach (table 16 equation 12). 35
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102 In  the  LYS  classification,  however,  only  crawling  peg  is  negative  at  a  one 
percent significance level for the growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile in all 
countries (table 18 equation 2). Thus this negative effect works only through the growth effect, 
as we do not find any significant distribution effect (compare table 18 equation 2 with table 16 
equation 2). Considering the additional macroeconomic variables, the adjusted Gini coefficient 
is again significantly positive for the growth rate  of the mean income of the second quintile 
(compare  table  18  equations  2  and  4  with  table  16  equations  2  and  4).
103 In  addition,  the 
significantly positive effect of budget surplus on the  first quintile is reinforced by the growth 
effect (compare table 18 equations 1 and 3 with table 16 equations 1 and 3). A one percentage 
points increase in budget surplus would raise the growth rate of the mean income of the first 
quintile share between 0.36 and 0.39 percentage points compared to 0.22 percentage points in 
regressions for the distribution effect. 
Concerning estimations for the coarse RR classification, none of the exchange rate regimes 
exhibits  significant  impact  on  the  growth  rate  of  the  mean  income  of  the  poor  (table  18 
equations 5 to 8). Thus the significant positive distribution effect of limited flexibility on the first 
quintile is not supported by the growth effect, even if the coefficients for limited flexibility remain 
similar  positive  (compare  table  18  equations  5  and  7  with  table  16  equations  5  and  7).  In 
addition, budget surplus affects positively the growth rate of the mean income of the first quintile 
in developing countries, a result primarily driven by the distribution effect (compare table 18 
equation 7 with table 16 equation 7). While the size of the coefficients for M2 to GDP ratio 
remains  broadly  the  same,  higher financial development is  now  significantly  positive for the 
growth  rate  of  the  mean  income  of  the  second  quintile  in  all  countries  (compare  table  18 
equations 5 to 8 with table 16 equations 5 to 8). If we test the reduced 4-way RR classification, 
findings for exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables remain identical with respect 
to statistical significance (table 18 equations 9 to 12). 
102 We also tested initial per capita income as convergence term in total effects regressions of the growth equation. 
However, we omit inital per capita income, since its coefficient was never statistically significant.
103 In regressions for the growth rate of the mean of the second quintile, more than 85 percent of the positive effect of 
the initial Gini coefficient stem from a positive distribution effect on the growth rate of the second quintile, confirming the 
hypothesis of inequality convergence (Ravallion 2000). However, one should be cautious interpreting these findings,  
since the coefficients of the constants are incredible highly negative in the fixed effects estimations. In addition, the 
positive total effects of initial inequality are not directly comparable to Forbes (2001), since we do not apply a first-
difference methodology (GMM) to estimate our growth equation, we use a different set of additional regressors, and our 
Gini coefficient is adjusted in a more accurate way.  36
In the system GMM approach we control for secondary education, government consumption, 
inflation, and, additionally, civil liberties, life expectancy, and terms-of-trade. Estimations for all 
countries do not indicate any significant impact of exchange rate regimes on the mean income 
of the first and second quintile (table 19 equations 1 to 4). Thus the positive distribution effect of 
managed floating in the unadjusted approach is apparently offset by the growth effect (compare 
table 19 equation 1 with table 17 equation 1). Results for developing countries, however, need a 
closer look. First, the highly significant positive distribution effect of category freely floating could 
only  be  confirmed  for  the  mean  income  of the  first  quintile  using  the  unadjusted  approach 
(compare table 19 equations 5 to 8 with table 17 equations 5 to 8). These findings, however, are 
not  amazing  if  we  compare  descriptive  statistics  for  the  mean  of  the  adjusted  first/second 
quintile and the mean of the mean income of the adjusted first/second quintile. While the mean 
of the first/second quintile for freely floating is highly positive with respect to other regimes (table 
6), the mean of the mean income of the first/second quintiles is rather low (table 8). Second, 
freely falling is amazingly significantly positive for both quintiles using the unadjusted approach 
(compare table 19 equations 5 and 7 with table 17 equations 5 and 7). Thus category freely 
falling  may  be  associated  with  a  positive  growth  effect in  developing  countries.  This  result, 
however, could not be confirmed in the adjusted approach (table 19 equations 6 and 8). While 
managed floating is insignificant for the total effect, the coefficients remain positive at a lower 
level  compared  to  the  distribution  effect  (compare  table  19  equations  5  to  8  with  table  17 
equations 5 to 8). Finally, limited flexibility is significantly positive for the mean income of the 
second quintile, a result primarily driven by the growth effect (compare table 19 equations 7 and 
8 with table 17 equations 7 and 8). Interpreting the system GMM approach as a level equation, 
the mean income of the second quintile share in countries with limited flexibility (narrow crawling 
peg or band) is, on average, between 12.2 and 14.5 percents higher than in countries using 
pegged regimes. Findings for industrial countries do not change for the total effect with respect 
to significant exchange rate regimes. While only category freely floating is negative for the mean 
income of the second quintile using the adjusted approach, the size of the coefficient is almost 
doubled by the growth effect (compare table 19 equation 12 to table 17 equation 12). If we test 
the 4-way RR classification, results remain unchanged in regressions for all countries (compare 
table 19 equations 13 to 16 with equations 1 to 4). While the significant coefficient of category 
freely  floating  for  the  first  quintile  disappears  in  developing  countries  using  the  unadjusted 
approach (compare table 19 equation 17 with equation 5), findings for  the second quintile in 
developing  countries  confirm the  significantly  positive  impact  of limited flexibility  with  almost 
unchanged size (compare table 19 equations 19 and 20 with equations 7 and 8).
Most  additional  macroeconomic  variables  impact  on  the  income  of  the  poor  in  the  way 
expected. In all and developing countries higher life expectancy and terms-of-trade increase the 
income of the poor, while raised government consumption diminishes the income of the poor 
(table  19  equations  1  to  8,  13  to  20).
104 Thus  a  one  percentage  point  rise  in  the  ratio  of 
104 The  variable  government  consumption  may  be  seen  as  a  proxy for  nonproductive  public  expenditures,  political 
corruption or bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995).37
government  consumption  to GDP  would  diminish  the  mean income  of  the  first  and  second 
quintile around 2 percent in developing countries. In addition, improved secondary education 
fosters the income of the poor only in all and industrial countries (table 19 equations 1 to 4 and 
9 to 12).
105 A one year rise of average years of secondary schooling would increase the mean 
income of the second quintile between 13 and 15 percent in all countries. While life expectancy 
is similar positive in industrial countries, terms-of-trade exhibit no significant effect in industrial 
countries (table 19 equations 9 to 12). Furthermore, the coefficient of inflation is negative in all 
estimations of the coarse RR classification, but only significant for the mean income of the first 
quintile in  industrial  countries  (table  19  equations  9  and  10).  Finally,  the  coefficient  of civil 
liberties is negative in all estimations, indicating a positive impact of civil liberties on the income 
of the poor since civil liberties is measured on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the 
most favorable state. This result, however, is weakened by the fact that the coefficient of civil 
liberties is weakly significant only in few estimations (table 19 equations 4, 8, 10, 16, 19, 20). 
Results  on  the  total  effect,  however,  have  the  shortcoming  that  tests  on  first-order  serial 
correlation are almost never passed.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we estimated the poverty effect of different exchange rate arrangements on the 
poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. To answer this question we regressed the first and second 
quintile and the mean of the first and second quintile on two de facto exchange rate regime 
classifications,  Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger  (2002)  and  Reinhart/Rogoff  (2003),  in  a  growth 
equation and an adjusted and unadjusted system GMM approach. Empirical results, however, 
vary considerably due to exchange rate regime classifications and econometric specifications.  
First, the classification process, i.e. the elements used to classify the de facto exchange rate 
regimes,  affect  the  findings  by  attributing  the  exchange  rate  arrangements  to  different 
categories in the LYS and RR classification (table 4). Thus coefficients for similar categories 
have very different results in both the growth and system GMM equation, even if this effect may 
also  be  caused  by  the  different  number  of  observations  and  time  periods  covered  in  both 
classifications. While none of the exchange rate regimes in the LYS classification are significant 
using the system GMM approach, arrangements in both the coarse and 4-way RR classification 
are relevant. Thus the problem of classifying exchange rate regimes correctly is still an open 
question, influencing the conclusions drawn from the estimations.
105 One exception is the insignificant coefficient for secondary education in the unadjusted approach (table 18 equation 
9). Another exception is the significantly positive coefficient for secondary education on the first quintile in developing 
countries in the unadjusted approach testing the 4-way RR classification (table 18 equation 17). 
106 Two  exceptions  are the estimations for the  mean income  of the second quintile  in industrial countries (table  18 
equations 11 and 12). 38
Second, coefficients of exchange rate regimes differ considerably for developing and industrial 
countries in the RR classification.
107 In industrial countries statistically significant exchange rate 
regimes affect negatively the poor (table 9, 10, 14, 17, 19). On the other hand, all statistically 
significant regimes in developing countries exhibit positive effects on the poor with respect to 
the  base  group  pegged  regimes (table 9, 10,  11,  12, 13,  16,  17,  19).  Thus  exchange  rate 
arrangements impact very differently on pro-poor growth in developing and industrial countries 
in the RR classification.
108
Considering the impact on the first and second quintile, only the poorest 20 percent are affected 
by exchange rate regimes in all and developing countries estimating the growth equation (table 
9, 11, 13, 16). In addition, we find only significant effects for dirty float (LYS) and freely floating 
(RR) on the poorest 20 to 40 percent in industrial countries, if we omit any additional regressors 
in the growth equation (table 9).
109 Using the system GMM approach with the RR classification, 
again, only the second quintile in industrial countries is affected significantly by exchange rate 
regimes (table 10, 14, 17, 19). However, estimations do not confirm a different effect on the 20 
and 20 to 40 percent poorest in all and developing countries, since estimations for both the first 
and second quintile share differ only modestly, and without discernable patterns (table 10, 12, 
17, 19).   
Fourth,  empirical  findings  differ  considerably  for  the  growth  equation  and  system  GMM 
approach.
110 We assign these differences in estimation results mainly to the fact that we regress 
the  level  of  the  first  and  second  quintile  on  exchange  rate  regimes  in  the  system  GMM 
approach, while we regress the growth rate of the first and second quintile on initial exchange 
rate regimes in the growth equation. Moreover, empirical findings differ often for the adjusted 
and  unadjusted  system  GMM  approach  (table  10,  12,  14,  17,  19).  Thus  the  statistical 
significance of exchange rate regimes depends critically on the solution of the incomparability 
problems of income inequality measures, i.e. whether we use unadjusted or adjusted first and 
second quintiles.   
Finally, we compare results for the coarse and 4-way RR classification. If we support the view 
that soft pegs are unsustainable, incredible, and prone to currency crisis, we  would replace 
category  freely falling  by  the  chosen  exchange  rate  arrangement.  In  this  case,  significantly 
positive coefficients of freely floating would disappear in allmost all regressions (table 10, 12, 
107 While descriptive statistics indicate remarkable differences for transitional countries, results of regression analysis 
would  be  misleading  due  to  limited  observations.  In  addition,  effects  of  exchange  rate  regimes  are  strongly 
superimposed by other macroeconomic shock effects in the transition period. 
108 Results for the LYS classification,  however,  are  not so clear since category dirty float  is significantly  positive  in 
developing countries for the growth rate of the first quintile and in industrial countries for the growth rate of the second 
quintile in regressions without outliers (table 9, 11, 13).  
109 We also find a significantly positive effect of dirty float on the growth rate of the second quintile if we add currency 
crises (table 13). 
110 To compare the estimations of the growth equations with system GMM estimations, coefficients have to be divided 









111 In  addition,  statistical  significance  and  size  for  coefficients  of  limited  flexibility  and 
managed floating change only slightly in most specifications (table 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19).
112
Thus even if incredible soft pegs break down, this would not change the often positive effect of 
intermediate  exchange  rate  regimes  in  developing  countries.  While the  significantly  positive 
effects of limited flexibility and managed floating are not robust to specifications, we do not find 
any significant negative poverty effects of intermediate arrangements. Thus we would cautiously 
conclude  that the  hollowing-out  hypothesis  could  not be  confirmed with  respect to pro-poor 
growth in developing countries. If we sort out freely falling as separate arrangement, we would 
argue that the poverty effects of exchange rate regimes are not independently discernable in 
situations  of  severe  macroeconomic  instabilities.  In  this  case  we  find  amazingly  significant 
positive coefficients of freely falling on the growth rate of the first quintile (table 9, 11, 13). On 
the  other  side,  freely  falling  is  significantly  negative  for  all  countries  in  the  system  GMM 
approach (table 10), a result not robust to other specifications. In addition, freely floating is now 
significantly positive in developing countries using the system GMM approach (table 10, 12, 17, 
19). The positive results for freely floating, however, should be interpreted with caution since 
these effects are only driven by two observations. 
Due to these varying and only weakly robust empirical results, it is difficult to derive a concise 
policy  recommendation  with  respect  to  a  poverty-reducing  exchange  rate  regime  choice. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the positive effects of limited flexibility and managed floating 
for the RR classification in developing countries should be emphasized. First, category limited 
flexibility  is  positively  associated  with  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the  first  quintile  in 
developing countries (table 11, 13, 16).
113 These positive distribution effects, however, are not 
present for the total effect. On the other hand, limited flexibility is positively associated with the 
mean income of the second quintile in the system GMM estimation in both the unadjusted and 
adjusted  approach  (table  19).  This  total  effect  is  only  driven  by  the  growth  effect.  Second, 
managed  floating  affects  positively  the  first  and  second  quintile  share  in  the  system  GMM 
estimation using the unadjusted approach in developing countries (table 12, 17). These positive 
distribution  effects,  however,  are  almost  never  confirmed  in  the  adjusted  approach.
114 In 
addition, no significant total effect of managed floating could be estimated in the system GMM 
approach. In combination with the positive coefficient of dirty float on the growth rate of the first 
quintile in the LYS classification for developing countries (table 9, 11), these results show at 
least a tendency to not negative and possible positive effects of intermediate regimes on the 
poorest 40 percent in developing countries.
111 Regressions with additional macroeconomic variables on the distribution effect in table 17 are one exception. The
significant  coefficients  for  freely  floating  in  the  reduced  4-way  RR  classification  (in  comparison  to  the  insignificant 
coefficients in table 12) stem mainly from the different sample size, since we have to omit several observations due to 
missing values and outliers for the inflation rate and government consumption. 
112 Exceptions  are regressions  on the second quintile  in  all  and developing countries in the system GMM approach 
(table 12 equations 4, 7, 8, 12, 15, 16) and regressions on the first quintile in all and developing countries in the growth 
equation (table 16 equations 5, 7, 9, 11). 
113 This  result  can  not  be  confirmed  in  regressions  with  additional  macroeconomic  variables  using  the  4-way 
classification (table 16). 
114 Two exceptions are regressions on the second quintile with regional dummy variables for the coarse and 4-way RR 
classification (table 12). 40
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Table 1: Coverage of the data set
Region Country Observations dates Source No. of spells
East Asia Pacific China  1982, 85, 88, 91  UNU 3
(EAP) 1994, 97 GPM 1
Hongkong 1971, 76, 81, 86, 91 UNU 4
Indonesia 1976, 80, 84, 87, 90 UNU 4
1993, 96, 99 GPM, WDI 2
Korea 1965, 70, 76, 80, 85, 88 UNU 5
Malaysia 1970, 76, 79, 84 UNU 3
1987, 92, 95 GPM 2
Philippines 1957, 61, 65 UNU 2
1965, 71, 85, 88, 91 UNU 4
1994, 97 UNU 1
Singapore 1978, 88 UNU 1
Thailand 1962, 69, 75, 81, 86, 90 UNU 5
1992, 98 UNU 1
Eastern Europe and  Bulgaria 1991, 93 UNU 1
Central Asia
(ECA) Belarus 1993, 95 GPM 1
Hungary 1972, 77, 82, 87 UNU 3
1989, 93 GPM 1
Latvia 1995, 98 GPM 1
Poland 1990, 93 UNU 1
Romania 1989, 92 UNU 1
Russia 1994, 98 GPM 1
Latin America and Brazil 1960, 70, 76, 80, 86 UNU 4
Caribbean (LAC) 1988, 93, 96 GPM 2
Chile 1968, 71 UNU 1
1989, 92 UNU 1
Colombia 1971, 78, 88 UNU 2
1988, 91, 95 UNU 2
Costa Rica 1961, 71, 77 UNU 2
1981, 86, 89 UNU 2
1993, 96 GPM 1
Dominican 1989, 96 GPM 1 
Republic
Ecuador 1988, 95 GPM 1
El Salvador 1989, 95, 98 GPM, WDI 2
Guatemala 1987, 89 UNU 1
Honduras 1989, 92, 96 GPM 2
Jamaica 1988, 91 UNU 1
1991, 96 UNU 1
Mexico 1950, 57, 63, 68, 75 UNU 4 
1984, 89 UNU 1
1989, 95, 98 GPM, WDI 2
Panama 1979, 89 UNU 1
1991, 95 GPM 147
Table 1: continued
Paraguay 95, 98 GPM, WDI 1
Peru 1986, 94 UNU 1
Trinidad & 1976, 81 UNU 1
Tobago 1988, 92 GPM 1
Venezuela 1962, 71, 81, 87 UNU 3
1987, 93, 96 GPM 2
Middle East and  Algeria 1988, 95 GPM 1
North Africa (MNA)
Egypt 1991, 95 UNU 1
Jordan 1980, 87, 91 UNU 2
1991, 97 UNU 1
Morocco 1984, 91 UNU 1
1991, 99 UNU 1
Tunisia 1985, 90, 95 GPM, WDI 2
Turkey 1968, 73, 87 UNU 2
1987, 94 GPM 1
Yemen 1992, 98 GPM, WDI 1
South Asia (SA) India 1951, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 
72, 77, 83, 86, 89, 92 UNU 12
1994, 97 UNU 1
Pakistan 1971, 79, 85, 88 UNU  3
1991, 96 UNU 1
Sri Lanka 1953, 63, 73, 79, 87 UNU 4
1990, 95 UNU 1
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)       ’                     
              
                       
                    
                    
              
                     
                    
                      
                     99 GPM, WDI 2
Mali 1989, 94 GPM 1
Mauretania 1988, 95 UNU 1
Mauritius 1986, 91 UNU 1
Niger 1992, 95 UNU 1
Nigeria 1985, 97 GPM 1
Senegal 1991, 95 UNU 1
Uganda 1989, 92, 96 GPM, WDI 2
Zambia 1993, 96 UNU 148
Table 1: continued
Industrial Countries (IND) Australia 1969, 76, 79 UNU 2
1981, 85, 89 UNU 2
1995, 98 UNU 1
Belgium 1979, 85, 88, 92 UNU 3
Canada 1951, 57, 61, 65, 69,  
73, 77, 81, 84, 87 DS/UNU 9
1987, 91 UNU 1
Denmark 1981, 87, 92 UNU 2
1992, 95 UNU 1
Finland 1978, 81, 84, 87, 91 UNU 4
1991, 94, 97 UNU 2
France 1979, 84 UNU 1
Germany 1973, 78, 81, 84 UNU 3
Greece 1974, 81, 88 UNU 2
Ireland 1973, 80, 87 UNU 2
Italia 1978, 81, 84, 87, 91 UNU 4
Japan 1962, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80 UNU 6
Netherlands 1975, 79, 82 UNU 2
1983, 87, 91 UNU 2
Norway 1967, 73, 76, 79, 84, 91 UNU 5
New Zealand 1973, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89 UNU 5
Portugal 1980, 90 UNU 1
Spain 1974, 81, 91 UNU 2
Sweden 1967, 75, 81, 87, 92 UNU 4
United Kingdom 1961, 64, 67, 71, 74, 77, 
80, 84, 88, 91 UNU 9
USA 1950, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 
71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89 UNU 13
No. of countries No. of observations No. of spells
Total 76 343 234
UNU:  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database
GPM:  Global Poverty Monitoring 
WDI:  World Development Indicators
DS:  Deininger and Squire  
Note: 
Pooled OLS estimation:  As all observations within each line have the same income/reference unit, spells are formed only within 
each line (e.g. Panama 1979, 89, 91, 95 results in two spells: 1979 –                                                          
                                                                                                                                
                                    
                       
                                                                     ’                          ’                                   
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                  
                       ’                                                                                                  
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Table 2: Adjustment regressions for first/second quintile income 
shares and Gini coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. First quintile  Second quintile Gini 
share of income  share of income coefficient
Income (unknown tax   -0.0149*** -0.0127*** 5.71***
treatment) (0.0043) (0.0049) (1.90)
Income, net 0.0046 0.0046 -1.81
(0.0036) (0.0040) (1.52)
Income, gross -0.0071** -0.0008 1.32
(0.0046) (0.0035) (1.36)
Family -0.0036 -0.0014 0.60
(0.0023) (0.0031) (0.82)
Person 0.0119*** 0.0185*** -6.62***
(0.0026) (0.0033) (1.20)
Household per capita 0.0108*** 0.0159*** -5.43***
(0.0032) (0.0041) (1.51)
Equivalized 0.0265*** 0.008*** -5.61***
(0.0033) (0.0029) (0.96)
EAP -0.0045** -0.0248*** 8.85***
(0.0022) (0.0029) (0.97)
ECA 0.0196*** 0.001 -1.00
(0.005) (0.0051) (1.96)
LAC -0.0272*** -0.0519*** 18.86***
(0.0024) (0.0032) (1.09)
MNA -0.0117*** -0.0328*** 12.00***
(0.0036) (0.0043) (1.67)
SA 0.0081*** -0.0128*** 4.65***
(0.0027) (0.0032) (1.25)
SSA -0.0199*** -0.0407*** 16.00***
(0.0042) (0.0055) (2.14)
Constant 0.0662*** 0.123*** 33.03***
(0.0033) (0.0036) (1.34)
N 371 371 371
R-Squared 0.6647 0.6716 0.6997
Note: This table reports the results of pooled OLS Regression for the indicated inequality measures on the indicated variables. 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses.50
Table 3: Data Sources
Variable Source Comments
Share of Income: UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see section 3
First/Second Quintile Inequality Database, Version 1.0 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty 
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion 
(2000), World Development Indicators 
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)
Real GDP Per Capita Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars using the 
(October 2002) Chain index 
Exchange rate Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) 5-way-classification
regimes (www.utdt.edu/~ely/papers.html)
Reinhart/Rogoff (March 3, 2003) coarse classification
www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/
reinhart/papers.htm
Gini coefficient UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see share of 
Inequality Database, Version 1.0  income quintile
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty 
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion 
(2000), World Development Indicators 
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)
Currency Crisis Glick/Hutchison (1999) dummy variable (1 = currency crisis)
currency  crisis,  if  index  of  currency 
pressure  (weighted  average  of 
monthly  real  exchange  rate  changes 
and monthly (percent) reserve losses) 
exceeds  the  mean  plus  2  times  the 
country-specific standard deviation
Capital Control IMF - Annual report on exchange dummy variable 
arrangements and exchange  ( 1 = restricted, 0 = not restricted)
restrictions (1968 –      
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Table 3: continued
ln(1+inflation/100) World Development Indicators (2001) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
(NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG)
for missing values: 
(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) Inflation, consumer prices (Laspeyres) 
(annual  %)  (Belarus  1993,  95; 
Canada  65;  Germany  1973,  78,  81, 
84;  Ethiopia  1981;  Poland  1990; 
Turkey 1968) 
Secondary Education  Barro and Lee (2000) Average years of secondary schooling  
in total population aged 25 and over
Due  to  limited  data  availability  for 
secondary  education  values  are 
linearily  interpolated  between  the 
years prior and after the observation.
M2 to GDP Word Development Indicators (2001) Money and quasi money (M2) to GDP
(FM.LBL.MOMY.GD.ZS)
Overall Budget  World DeveIopment Indicators (2001) Overall Budget, including grants
Surplus (+)/ (GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS)
Deficit (-) to GDP
for missing values:
Easterly, Sewadeh (2002): Global  Data on overall budget/deficit   
Development Network Growth from IMF Government Financial 
Database, World Bank Statistics (Germany 1973, 78, 81, 84;
Tunisia 1990; Latvia 1995)
Life expectancy World development indicators (2001) life expectancy at birth, total (years)
(SP.DYN.LE00.IN) Values  calcutated  by  linear 
interpolation  for  Guatemala  1989, 
India 1994, Kenya 1994 
for missing value:
World Population Prospects: The  Jordan 1980
2002 Revision Population Database
Terms  of  Trade Easterly, Sedaweh (2002): Global Terms of Trade (goods and  
Development Network Growth services, 1995 = 100)
Database, World Bank52
Table 3: continued
Civil Liberties Freedom House Measured on a scale of 1 to 7.
(1  indicates  the  most  liberal 
country)
Output volatility Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars using the 
(October 2002) Chain index, three year moving 
standard deviation of annual real GDP 
per capita growth (e.g. Australia 1976: 
standard deviation of growth rates for 
Australia 1974, 75, 76)53
Table 4: Two-way tables of frequency
Exchange rate regimes and currency crises
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) Coarse 4-way 
5-way classification classification classification
Currency crisis Currency crisis Currency crisis
1 0 1 0 1 0
Fixed 5 50 Pegged 4 34 4 35
Crawling peg 3 33 Limited flexibility 9 76 11 76
Dirty float 7 12 Managed floating 4 41 8 50
Flexible 7 43 Freely floating 0 4 3 7
Freely falling 9 16
Inconclusives 0 4 Category 6 1 1 1 4
Exchange rate regimes Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger and Reinhart/Rogoff
Levy-Yeyati/ Fixed Crawling Dirty Flexible Incon-
Sturzenegger (2002): peg float clusives
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003)
coarse classification
Pegged 32 4 2 3 5
Limited flexibility 17 26 10 25 0
Managed floating 10 6 2 16 0
Freely floating 0 1 0 13 0
Freely falling 5 4 5 7 0
Category 6 0 0 1 1 0
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003)
4-way classification
Pegged 33 4 2 3 5
Limited flexibility 17 27 10 26 0
Managed floating 12 7 5 21 0
Freely floating 1 3 2 14 0
Category 6 1 0 1 1 0
Note: For description of exchange rate classifications, see section 3.2. 54
Table 5: Exchange rate regimes and mean of average annual growth 
of first and second quintile share of income
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002),  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,










Fixed 0.11 -0.14 41 Pegged -0.34 -0.20 75 -0.34 -0.20 75
Crawling peg 0.34 -0.34 24 Lim. flexibility 0.33 -0.08 74 0.38 -0.04 75
Dirty Float 1.50 0.45 11 Man. floating -0.45 -0.15 50 0.08 0.30 61
Flexible 0.12 0.003 43 Freely floating -0.58 -0.85 8 -2.16 -1.37 15
Freely falling 0.23 0.60 21
Inconclusives -3.52 -3.20 3 Category 6 -1.50 -0.83 2 -0.37 -0.94 4
Developing countries  Developing countries
Fixed  -0.12 -0.04 31 Pegged -0.52 -0.23 47 -0.52 -0.23 47
Crawling peg 0.42 -0.06 17 Lim. flexibility 0.96 0.29 35 1.04 0.35 36
Dirty float 1.67 0.36 9 Man. floating -0.63 -0.17 32 0.16 0.48 43
Flexible 0.31 0.27 22 Freely floating . . 0 0.62 0.35 5
Freely falling 2.04 1.72 18
Inconclusives -3.52 -3.20 3 Category 6 -0.51 -0.23 1 0.98 0.30 1
Transitional countries
116 Transitional countries
Pegged -8.53 -2.44 2 -8.53 -2.44 2
Lim. flexibility . . 0
Dirty float -13.87 -2.78 1 Man. floating -0.40 -0.53 4 -0.40 -0.53 4
Freely floating . . 0 -15.41 -7.73 2
Freely falling -10.59 -6.13 3
Category 6 -2.50 -1.44 1 -1.72 -2.18 2
Industrial countries Industrial countries
Fixed 0.8 -0.46 10 Pegged 0.61 0.03 26
Crawling peg 0.14 -1.01 7 Lim. flexibility -0.23 -0.41 39
Dirty float 0.74 0.86 2 Man. floating -0.03 -0.01 14
Flexible -0.09 -0.27 21 Freely floating -0.58 -0.85 8
Freely falling . . 0
Inconclusives . 0 Category 6 . . 0
115 In the dirty float category we omit Poland 1990 because of its biasing effect (see transitional countries).
116 As there is only one initial exchange rate regime for transitional countries, the values are given by the spell Poland 1990 –
     55
Table 6: Exchange rate regimes and mean of adjusted first and 
second quintile share of income
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002 Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,









Fixed 0.053 0.094 68 Pegged 0.057 0.098 97 0.057 0.098 98
Crawling peg 0.056 0.097 41 Lim. flexibility 0.063 0.108 108 0.062 0.108 110
Dirty Float 0.054 0.093 20 Man. floating 0.056 0.096 67 0.054 0.092 81
Flexible 0.057 0.100 69 Freely floating 0.063 0.117 15 0.064 0.110 25
Freely falling 0.048 0.082 30
Inconclusives 0.073 0.106 5 Category 6 0.069 0.113 4 0.053 0.095 7
Developing countries 
Fixed  0.048 0.083 49 Pegged 0.052 0.085 65 0.052 0.084 66
Crawling peg 0.050 0.084 29 Lim. flexibility 0.059 0.094 57 0.058 0.093 59
Dirty float 0.052 0.090 16 Man. floating 0.049 0.084 45 0.047 0.082 59
Flexible 0.051 0.085 40 Freely floating 0.066 0.10 2 0.048 0.078 7
Freely falling 0.039 0.072 24
Inconclusives 0.073 0.106 5 Category 6 0.089 0.127 1 0.050 0.086 3
Transitional countries
Fixed 0.080 0.126 1 Pegged 0.086 0.128 3 0.086 0.128 3
Crawling peg . . 0 Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0
Dirty float 0.062 0.096 2 Man. floating 0.096 0.132 6 0.096 0.132 6
Flexible 0.074 0.121 2 Freely floating . . 0 0.091 0.130 5
Freely falling 0.082 0.122 6
Inconclusive . . 0 Category 6 0.062 0.109 3 0.055 0.102 4
Industrial countries
Fixed 0.066 0.122 18 Pegged 0.067 0.126 29
Crawling peg 0.073 0.130 12 Lim. flexibility 0.068 0.124 51
Dirty float 0.058 0.112 2 Man. floating 0.061 0.115 16
Flexible 0.064 0.121 27 Freely floating 0.063 0.119 13
Freely falling . . 0
Inconclusives . 0 Category 6 . . 056
Table 7: Exchange rate regimes and mean of average annual growth 
of mean income of first and second quintile share
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,










Fixed 1.67 1.43 41 Pegged 1.81 1.96 75 1.81 1.96 75
Crawling peg 1.92 1.25 24 Lim. flexibility 2.96 2.55 74 2.96 2.54 75
Dirty Float 4.17 3.12 11 Man. floating 2.06 2.36 50 2.24 2.46 61
Flexible 2.31 2.19 43 Freely floating 1.71 1.45 8 -1.64 -0.85 15
Freely falling -0.29 0.08 21
Inconclusives -0.15 -0.16 3 Category 6 -5.29 -4.62 2 -3.67 -4.24 4
Developing countries 
Fixed  1.24 1.32 31 Pegged 1.49 1.78 47 1.49 1.78 47
Crawling peg 2.27 4.66 17 Lim. flexibility 4.01 3.33 35 3.98 3.29 36
Dirty float 4.28 2.96 9 Man. floating 2.25 2.72 32 2.45 2.77 43
Flexible 2.60 2.55 22 Freely floating . . 0 1.64 1.38 5
Freely falling 2.45 2.13 18
Inconclusives -0.15 0.16 3 Category 6 1.26 1.55 1 0.34 -0.34 2
Transitional countries
118
Pegged -6.45 -0.36 2 -6.45 -.36 2
Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0
Dirty float -14.28 -3.19 1 Man. floating 0.91 0.79 4 0.91 0.79 4
Freely floating . . 0 -23.30 -15.61 2
Freely falling -16.70 -12.24 3
Category 6 -11.84 -10.79 1 -7.67 -8.13 2
Industrial countries
Fixed 3.00 1.75 10 Pegged 3.05 2.47 26
Crawling peg 1.08 -0.07 7 Lim. flexibility 2.02 1.85 39
Dirty float 3.69 3.81 2 Man. floating 1.96 1.97 14
Flexible 2.01 1.82 21 Freely floating 1.71 1.45 8
Freely falling . . 0
Inconclusives . . 0 Category 6 . . 0
117 In the dirty float category we omit Poland 1990 because of its biasing effect (see transitional countries).
118 As there is only one initial exchange rate regime for transitional countries, the values are given by the spell Poland 1990 –
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Table 8: Exchange rate regimes and mean of mean income of 
adjusted first and second quintile share
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,









Fixed 2277 4078 68 Pegged 2093 3756 97 2084 3738 98
Crawling peg 2388 4238 41 Lim. flexibility 3204 5743 108 3157 5661 110
Dirty Float 1936 3340 20 Man. floating 1989 3480 67 1830 3211 81
Flexible 2844 5295 69 Freely floating 5317 10116 15 3924 7172 25
Freely falling 1244 2087 30
Inconclusives 966 1430 5 Category 6 1499 2628 4 1085 2028 7
Developing countries 
Fixed  964 1670 49 Pegged 894 1489 65 899 1497 66
Crawling peg 952 1653 29 Lim. flexibility 1210 1991 57 1190 1964 59
Dirty float 1567 2640 16 Man. floating 786 1369 45 853 1501 59
Flexible 926 1608 40 Freely floating 810 1153 2 889 1486 7
Freely falling 928 1668 24
Inconclusives 966 1430 5 Category 6 416 593 1 225 388 3
Transitional countries
Fixed 2736 4319 1 Pegged 2778 4126 3 2778 4126 3
Crawling peg . . 0 Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0
Dirty float 2066 3240 2 Man. floating 4071 5564 6 4071 5564 6
Flexible 2178 3628 2 Freely floating . . 0 2746 3892 5
Freely falling 2511 3762 6
Inconclusive . . 0 Category 6 1860 3306 3 1729 3892 4
Industrial countries
Fixed 5826 10621 18 Pegged 4709 8798 29
Crawling peg 5859 10483 12 Lim. flexibility 5433 9937 51
Dirty float 4756 9045 2 Man. floating 4592 8635 16
Flexible 5736 10881 27 Freely floating 6011 11495 13
Freely falling . . 0
Inconclusives . 0 Category 6 . . 058
Table 9: Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth
distribution effect (Growth equation)
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
All countries All countries










Crawling peg 0.23 0.69 -0.19 -0.61 Limited flexibility 0.67 0.58 0.12 0.12
(1.04) (0.95) (0.73) (0.68) (0.69) (0.55) (0.40) (0.36)
Dirty Float 0.12 1.85* 0.33 -0.09 Managed floating -0.10 0.15 0.04 -0.12
(1.62) (0.98) (0.75) (0.70) (0.82) (0.79) (0.43) (0.37)
Flexible 0.01 0.80 0.15 -0.27 Freely floating -0.24 0.01 -0.66** -0.66**
(0.99) (0.84) (0.58) (0.52) (0.73) (0.69) (0.32) (0.29)
Freely falling 0.57 2.37** 0.80 0.36
(1.80) (0.93) (1.20) (0.74)
Constant 0.11 -0.34 -0.14 0.27 Constant -0.34 -0.59 -0.20 -0.19
(0.86) (0.74) (0.48) (0.40) (0.49) (0.43) (0.28) (0.23)
F-test 0.04 1.29 0.16 0.29 F-test 0.51 1.91 2.40* 2.36*
R
2 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 R
2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
N 120 117 120 118 N 228 222 228 223
Developing countries  Developing countries










Crawling peg 0.54 1.15 -0.02 -0.58 Limited flexibility 1.48 1.17 0.52 0.51
(1.35) (1.23) (0.91) (0.84) (1.12) (0.78) (0.62) (0.57)
Dirty float 1.79 2.40** 0.40 -0.16 Managed floating -0.11 0.29 0.06 -0.20
(1.33) (1.20) (0.93) (0.86) (1.14) (1.07) (0.64) (0.54)
Flexible 0.43 1.71 0.31 -0.25 Freely floating . . . .
(1.43) (1.15) (0.88) (0.80)
Freely falling 2.55 2.88*** 1.95 0.96
(1.67) (1.03) (1.22) (0.72)
Constant -0.12 -0.73 -0.04 0.52 Constant -0.52 -0.92 -0.23 -0.22
(1.09) (0.93) (0.62) (0.51) (0.69) (0.57) (0.41) (0.33)
F-test 0.83 1.43 0.11 0.16 F-test 1.33 2.84* 1.02 1.03
R
2 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 R
2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03
N 79 77 79 77 N 132 128 132 128
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled –     
                                                                                                                                   
                                                     
q20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. y
q40: average annual 
growth  rate  of  the  second  quintile  share.  y
q20o:  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the first  quintile  share (regressions  without 
outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).   59
Table 9: continued
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
Industrial countries Industrial countries










Crawling peg -0.66 0.21 -0.55 0.46 Limited flexibility -0.84 -1.07* -0.44 -0.07
(1.20) (0.88) (1.09) (0.50) (0.59) (0.54) (0.43) (0.36)
Dirty float -0.06 0.81 1.32** 1.32** Managed floating -0.64 -1.55** -0.05 -0.05
(1.26) (0.97) (0.55) (0.55) (1.16) (0.77) (0.45) (0.45)
Flexible -0.89 -0.02 0.19 0.19 Freely floating -1.19* -1.19* -0.88***-0.88***
(1.08) (0.79) (0.43) (0.43) (0.67) (0.67) (0.32) (0.32)
Freely falling . . . .
Constant 0.80 -0.07 -0.46 -0.46 Constant 0.61 0.61 0.03 0.03
(1.08) (0.71) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.26) (0.26)
F-test 0.54 0.43 2.78* 2.55* F-test 1.29 2.18* 3.35** 4.29**
R
2 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.09 R
2 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03
N 40 39 40 39 N 87 85 87 85
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled –     
                                                                                                                                   
                                                     
q20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. y
q40: average annual 
growth  rate  of  the  second  quintile  share.  y
q20o:  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the first  quintile  share (regressions  without 
outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).   60
Table 9: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification
All countries






Limited flexibility 0.72 0.63 0.15 0.05
(0.68) (0.55) (0.39) (0.35)
Managed floating 0.43 0.35 0.50 0.09
(0.86) (0.77) (0.52) (0.39)
Freely floating -1.82 0.47 -1.17 -0.30
(1.54) (0.71) (0.75) (0.31)
Constant -0.34 -0.59 -0.20 -0.09
(0.49) (0.43) (0.27) (0.21)
F-test 1.10 0.45 1.43 0.49
R
2 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.002
N 226 221 226 220
Developing countries






Limited flexibility 1.56 1.27 0.58 0.41
(1.10) (0.78) (0.61) (0.54)
Managed floating 0.68 0.63 0.71 0.11
(1.17) (1.02) (0.74) (0.54)
Freely floating 1.13 1.54 0.58 0.41
(1.34) (1.28) (0.54) (0.45)
Constant -0.52 -0.92 -0.23 -0.06
(0.69) (0.57) (0.41) (0.29)
F-test 0.72 1.07 0.53 0.36
R
2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.005
N 131 128 131 127
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled –     
                                                                                                                                   
                                                     
q20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. y
q40: average annual 
growth  rate  of  the  second  quintile  share.  y
q20o:  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the first  quintile  share (regressions  without 
outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).   61
Table 10: Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth
distribution effect (System GMM estimation)
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
All Countries Developing Countries 










Limited flexibility 0.072 0.101** 0.061* 0.083** 0.083 0.103 0.058 0.075*
(0.054) (0.050) (0.036) (0.038) (0.068) (0.064) (0.041) (0.040)
Managed floating 0.020 -0.004 0.002 -0.012 -0.003 -0.010 0.015 0.001
(0.061) (0.061) (0.041) (0.046) (0.075) (0.069) (0.048) (0.047)
Freely floating 0.048 0.148* 0.128** 0.182*** 0.281***0.238***0.185***0.173***
(0.090) (0.080) (0.058) (0.061) (0.102) (0.114) (0.056) (0.064)
Freely falling -0.152* -0.161* -0.120**-0.136* -0.131 -0.142 -0.073 -0.086
(0.088) (0.090) (0.060) (0.070) (0.091) (0.090) (0.060) (0.066)
Constant -1.28***-1.32***-0.67***-0.75*** -1.38***-1.43***-0.79***-0.89***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
m1 -1.60 -2.65*** -1.78* -2.81*** -1.60 -2.56** -1.68* -2.59***
m2 -1.75* -1.15 -1.95* 0.88 -1.23 -0.87 -1.91* 0.84
N 321 307 321 307 201 191 201 191
1 –                                                
Industrial Countries






Limited flexibility -0.004 0.032 -0.022 -0.009
(0.075) (0.049) (0.020) (0.021)
Managed floating 0.036 -0.042 -0.039 -0.054*
(0.086) (0.072) (0.033) (0.032)
Freely floating -0.157 -0.033 -0.069 -0.041
(0.102) (0.082) (0.049) (0.048)
Constant -1.11***-1.13***-0.45***-0.47***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
m1 -0.77 -0.72 -1.30 -1.75*
m2 -1.19 -1.81* -0.99 -1.35
N 111 107 111 107
1 –                            
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
20/40/0.2) adjusted approach. 62
Table 10: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification
All Countries Developing Countries 










Limited flexibility 0.072 0.092* 0.063* 0.078** 0.080 0.087 0.059 0.066*
(0.053) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.067) (0.063) (0.041) (0.040)
Managed floating -0.005 -0.029 -0.013 -0.029 -0.021 -0.033 0.003 -0.012
(0.058) (0.057) (0.040) (0.042) (0.070) (0.064) (0.045) (0.042)
Freely floating 0.017 0.074 0.063 0.081 -0.002 -0.021 0.0002 -0.024
(0.101) (0.096) (0.071) (0.075) (0.160) (0.139) (0.100) (0.098)
Constant -1.30***-1.32***-0.68***-0.75*** -1.39***-1.43***-0.79***-0.89***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
m1 -1.64 -2.18** -1.81* -2.77*** -1.56 -2.02** -1.76* -2.53**
m2 -1.61* -1.76* -1.94* 0.97 -1.08 -1.17 -1.75* 0.15
N 319 305 319 305 199 189 199 189
1 –                                                
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
20/40/0.2) adjusted approach. 63
Table 11: Exchange rate regimes and regional dummies 
distribution effect (Growth equation)
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002 Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification










all all dev dev all all dev dev
ols re ols re ols re ols re
Crawling peg 0.37 -0.48 0.79 -0.43 Limited flexibility 0.44 0.08 1.29* 0.52
(0.95) (0.63) (1.26) (0.88) (0.49) (0.37) (0.73) (0.57)
Dirty float 1.62 0.16 2.13* -0.12 Managed floating 0.46 -0.09 0.47 -0.32
(0.99) (0.82) (1.21) (1.07) (0.83) (0.42) (1.10) (0.61)
Flexible 0.60 -0.08 1.46 -0.22 Freely floating -0.36 -0.64
(0.85) (0.55) (1.18) (0.82) (0.69) (0.85)
Freely falling 3.13*** 0.53 3.31*** 1.01
(1.11) (0.63) (1.20) (0.77)
EAP -0.26 0.12 1.02 -0.97 -0.82 0.05 -1.37 -0.83
(0.86) (0.66) (1.72) (1.10) (0.73) (0.44) (1.60) (0.77)
ECA -2.66 -3.29* -1.92**
(2.51) (1.93) (0.85)
LAC 0.65 0.93 1.87 -0.13 -1.44* -0.18 -1.76 -1.05
(0.92) (0.58) (1.84) (1.04) (0.84) (0.48) (1.47) (0.73)
MNA 1.01 1.05 2.27 -0.03 0.82 1.00 0.36 0.18
(0.95) (0.93) (1.82) (1.34) (0.79) (0.69) (1.57) (0.96)
SA 0.03 0.30 1.06 -0.77 0.12 -0.03 -0.37 -0.93
(0.63) 0.98) (1.67) (1.43) (0.60) (0.55) (1.66) (0.86)
SSA -1.43 1.08 0.20 0.78
(1.61) (0.87) (1.50) (0.63)
Constant -0.25 -0.28 -1.88 0.86 -0.22 -0.22 -0.06 0.52
(0.78) (0.53) (1.68) (0.90) (0.42) (0.34) (1.62) (0.68)
Breusch-Pagan 6.49** 6.65*** 5.51** 5.68**
F- test 0.87 1.05 1.84* 2.91***
Wald –                          
 
2 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06
N 117 118 77 77 222 223 128 128
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  F-test/Wald-test  indicate  the  F-statistic/Wald-statistic  for  the  test  on  the  overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1, 3, 5, 7). 
Breusch-Pagan  is  a  Lagrange-multiplier  test  for  the  random  effects  model,  distributed  as  chi-squared  under  the  null  of  no 
random effects. y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for 
random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries.64
Table 11: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification






all all dev dev
ols re ols re
Limited flexibility 0.60 0.12 1.49** 0.53
(0.49) (0.37) (0.73) (0.58)
Managed floating 0.62 -0.23 0.83 -0.08
(0.80) (0.41) (1.04) (0.58)
Freely floating 0.50 -0.31 1.93 0.19
(0.73) (0.67) (1.36) (1.22)
EAP -0.76 0.07 -1.73 -1.56*
(0.72) (0.43) (1.64) (0.81)
ECA -3.13 -0.88
(2.17) (0.95)
LAC -0.91 0.25 -1.80 -1.29*
(0.81) (0.43) (1.57) (0.77)
MNA 1.09 1.06 0.16 -0.50
(0.73) (0.68) (1.57) (1.00)
SA 0.24 0.01 -0.63 -1.61*
(0.60) (0.54) (1.71) (0.90)
SSA 0.71 1.50**
(1.51) (0.64)
Constant -0.40 -0.27 0.13 1.19





2 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
N 221 220 128 127
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  F-test/Wald-test  indicate  the  F-statistic/Wald-statistic  for  the  test  on  the  overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in equation 11, but not passed in equation 9. 
Breusch-Pagan  is  a  Lagrange-multiplier  test  for  the  random  effects  model,  distributed  as  chi-squared  under  the  null  of  no 
random effects. y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for 
random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries.65
Table 12: Exchange rate regimes and regional dummies
distribution effect (System GMM estimation)
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), coarse classification










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Limited flexibility 0.044 0.052 0.026 0.030* 0.063 0.052 0.045 0.046*
(0.043) (0.036) (0.019) (0.017) (0.051) (0.049) (0.028) (0.025)
Managed floating 0.083* 0.041 0.045* 0.026 0.099* 0.069 0.076** 0.056*
(0.043) (0.039) (0.025) (0.023) (0.053) (0.048) (0.032) (0.029)
Free floating -0.037 0.044 0.014 0.029 0.280***0.247***0.186***0.172***
(0.090) (0.073) (0.051) (0.048) (0.061) (0.044) (0.032) (0.029)
Freely falling 0.030 -0.013 0.011 -0.005 0.043 -0.004 0.031 0.010
(0.056) (0.064) (0.039) (0.046) (0.062) (0.069) (0.043) (0.049)
Eap -0.13 -0.07 -0.22***-0.25*** 0.08 0.38*** 0.06 0.20**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Eca 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.14*** 0.10***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Lac -0.61***-0.55***-0.51***-0.58*** -0.40***-0.10 -0.23***-0.13*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
Mna -0.08 -0.20** -0.20***-0.32*** 0.13 0.26** 0.08 0.13*
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
Sa 0.19** 0.11** -0.03 -0.12*** 0.41*** 0.58*** 0.25*** 0.33***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Ssa -0.21** -0.45***-0.28***-0.44***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -1.16***-1.16***-0.40***-0.51*** -1.38***-1.63***-0.79***-0.98***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
m1 -1.61 -2.20** -1.75* -2.68*** -1.49 -2.09** -1.63 -2.47**
m2 -1.47 -1.05 -2.14** -0.39 -1.01 -0.39 -2.05** -0.26
N 321 307 321 307 201 191 201 191
1 –                                                
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
20/40/0.2) adjusted approach. 66
Table 12: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), 4-way classification










(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Limited flexibility 0.047 0.042 0.029 0.026 0.067 0.037 0.050* 0.038
(0.043) (0.036) (0.020) (0.018) (0.052) (0.050) (0.029) (0.026)
Managed floating 0.075* 0.034 0.042* 0.023 0.090* 0.054 0.070** 0.048*
(0.040) (0.038) (0.024) (0.021) (0.049) (0.046) (0.031) (0.026)
Freely floating -0.006 0.030 0.014 0.012 0.122   0.073 0.074 0.040
(0.075) (0.069) (0.044) (0.046) (0.116) (0.117) (0.072) (0.079)
Eap -0.13 -0.08 -0.22***-0.25*** 0.06 0.37*** 0.05 0.19**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Eca 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.14*** 0.09***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Lac -0.61***-0.57***-0.51***-0.59*** -0.43***-0.13 -0.25***-0.15*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Mna -0.08 -0.20** -0.20***-0.32*** 0.11 0.24** 0.06 0.12
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
Sa 0.20** 0.11** -0.03 -0.12*** 0.39*** 0.56*** 0.24*** 0.32***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Ssa -0.19** -0.44***-0.27***-0.44***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant -1.16***-1.15***-0.50***-0.51*** -1.36***-1.60***-0.78***-0.96***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
m1 -1.63 -2.10** -1.77* -2.77*** -1.50 -1.94* -1.66* -2.60***
m2 -1.56 -1.01 -2.20** -0.58 -1.14 -0.56 -2.10** 0.02
N 319 305 319 305 199 189 199 189
1 –                                                
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
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Table 13: Exchange rate regimes and currency crises
distribution effect (Growth Equation)
Levy-Yeyati/  Reinhart/
Sturzenegger 2002 Rogoff 2003: coarse classification 4-way classification








indu indu dev dev dev dev
ols re ols re re re
Crawling Peg 0.33 Limited -0.25 2.04* 1.22 2.15* 0.83
(0.49) flexibility (0.56) (1.08) (0.82) (1.21) (0.85)
Dirty Float 1.19** Managed -0.37 1.68 0.72 1.84 0.90
(0.54) floating (0.60) (1.47) (0.97) (1.26) (0.88)
Flexible 0.55 Freely floating -1.06 0.69 -0.05
(0.45) (0.94) (2.12) (1.47)
Freely falling 2.79* 1.16
(1.42) (0.95)
Currency -1.27* Currency -1.05** 1.77 1.65* 2.63** 1.67*
Crisis (0.65) Crisis (0.55) (1.31) (0.86) (1.34) (0.89)
Constant -0.33 Constant 0.29 -1.50 -1.01 -1.65* -0.61
(0.35) (0.50) (0.94) (0.68) (1.00) (0.71)
F-test 2.70* F-test 2.45*
Wald-test 5.01 6.59 6.65 4.47
Breusch- Breusch-
Pagan  Pagan 4.13** 10.28*** 3.64* 9.29***
R
2 0.22 R
2 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06
N 30 N 44 80 81 80 80
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  F-test/Wald-test  indicate  the  F-statistic/Wald-statistic  for  the  test  on  the  overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1 and 3). 
Breusch-Pagan  is  a  Lagrange  multiplier  test  for  the  random  effects model,  distributed  as  chi-squared  under  the  null  of  no 
random effects. y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation. re: results for 
random effects estimation. dev: developing countries. indu: industrial countries.68
Table 14: Exchange rate regimes and currency crises
distribution effect (System GMM estimation)
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), coarse classification









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Limited flexibility 0.008 0.029 0.023 0.043 -0.063**-0.030
(0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034)
Managed floating 0.021 0.010 0.054 0.037 -0.083**-0.078**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.039)
Freely floating 0.045 0.082*** -0.024 0.023
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.032)
Freely falling -0.045 -0.054 -0.028 -0.038
(0.044) (0.053) (0.062) (0.055)
Currency Crisis 0.040* 0.029 0.047 0.028  0.032** 0.023***
(0.023) (0.028) (0.034) (0.040) (0.013) (0.008)
EAP -0.23***-0.26*** 0.03 -0.14**




(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
MNA -0.18***-0.31*** 0.08 -0.10
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
SA 0.002 -0.09** 0.26*** 0.32***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
SSA -0.25***-0.40***
(0.05) (0.06)
Constant -0.47***-0.51*** -0.74***-0.92*** -0.40***-0.45***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
m1 -2.22** -2.58*** -2.11** -2.50** -1.70* -1.32
m2 1.51 1.97** 1.38 1.82* -1.71* -0.41
N 201 194 127 124 67 63
1 –                                      
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
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Table 14: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), 4-way classification






(7) (8) (9) (10)
Limited flexibility 0.011 0.019 0.028 0.031
(0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
Managed floating 0.014 -0.005 0.036 0.012
(0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
Free floating -0.012 -0.006 -0.028 -0.030
(0.064) (0.073) (0.092) (0.100)
Currency Crisis 0.027 0.011 0.031 0.006 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.031) (0.040)
EAP -0.23***-0.27*** 0.01 0.12*




(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
MNA -0.19***-0.32*** 0.05 0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
SA -0.004 -0.10** 0.24*** 0.29***




(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
m1 -2.07* -2.20** -1.94* -2.30**
m2 1.11 1.84* 1.31 1.87*
N 199 192 125 122
1 –                            
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 




20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Y
q20c/Y
q40c: ln(Q
20/40/0.2) adjusted approach. 70
Table 15: Exchange rate regimes and inflation 
distribution effect (Growth equation)
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003:  coarse classification 4-way classification








dev dev dev dev dev dev
ols re re re re re
Limited flexibility 1.11 0.43 1.15 0.37
(0.75) (0.61) (1.01) (0.61)
Managed floating 0.48 -0.61 0.24 -0.58
(1.12) (0.65) (1.04) (0.64)
Freely floating -2.13 -1.65
(2.71) (1.65)
Freely falling 0.82 -0.41
(1.80) (1.11)
ln(1+inflation) 7.31* 3.60 9.93*** 3.91* 7.06*** 3.28*
(4.00) (2.28) (3.42) (2.09) (2.68) (1.70)
EAP -0.73 -0.72 -1.12 -1.46* -0.38 0.57
(1.52) (0.80) (1.35) (0.83) (1.23) (0.78)
ECA
LAC -1.49 -0.76 -2.23* -1.24 -1.26 0.60
(1.45) (0.77) (1.29) (0.80) (1.19) (0.76)
MNA 0.93 0.49 0.64 -0.25 1.38 1.64*
(1.54) (1.00) (1.66) (1.02) (1.53) (0.97)
SA -0.51 -1.15 -0.96 -1.89 -0.23 0.30
(1.61) (0.95) (1.57) (0.97) (1.43) (0.91)
SSA
Constant -0.99 0.16 -0.80 0.90 -0.70 -1.03
(1.62) (0.76) (1.20) (0.78) (1.11) (0.70)
Breusch-Pagan 8.69*** 4.59** 8.86*** 4.19** 6.13**
F- test 2.38**
Wald –                                   
 
2 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.05
N 117 117 117 116 123 123
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  F-test/Wald-test  indicate  the  F-statistic/Wald-statistic  for  the  test  on  the  overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in OLS estimation (equation 1). Breusch-
Pagan is a Lagrange-multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. 
y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth rate of the 
second  quintile  share  (regressions  without  outliers).  ols:  results  for  pooled  OLS  estimation,  re:  results  for  random  effects 
estimation. dev: developing countries.71
Table 16: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables
distribution effect (Growth equation)
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002 Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification










all/ols all/fe dev/ols dev/fe all/ols all/re dev/ols dev/re
Crawling peg -0.38 -0.88 0.09 -0.69 Limited flexibility 1.34* 0.81 1.53** 0.82
(1.15) (1.34) (1.31) (1.80) (0.80) (0.82) (0.79) (0.90)
Dirty float 0.69 2.47 1.22 1.84 Managed floating 0.64 0.25 -0.69 -0.51
(1.23) (1.54) (1.53) (2.04) (1.54) (1.02) (1.16) (1.25)
Flexible -0.03 1.60 0.64 1.59 Freely floating 0.16 0.59
(1.10) (1.13)  (1.25) (1.24) (1.49) (1.54)
Freely falling 1.35 0.71 -0.38 -0.71
(2.50) (1.58) (2.44) (1.80)
M2/GDP 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03** 0.03 0.04* 0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Budget  0.22** -0.18 0.22** 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.30** 0.12
Surplus (0.10) (0.16)  (0.11) (0.32) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
Secondary -0.24 -1.26 -0.53 -1.01 -0.15 -0.57 -0.41 -0.89
Education (0.34) (1.27) (1.01) (3.00) (0.47) (0.43) (0.92) (0.73)
Adjusted Gini -0.002 1.01*** -0.02 1.07*** 0.13 0.16** 0.09 0.15*
Coefficient (0.055) (0.16)  (0.08) (0.24) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Ln(1+inflation) 1.27 0.22  2.72 2.85 1.91 1.98 6.74 6.53
(3.58) (7.90)  (4.61) (12.12) (5.59) (4.20) (5.55) (5.05)
EAP -1.08 -1.64 -3.65*** -1.56
(1.67) (1.21) (1.30) (1.87)
ECA -1.29 0.05
(2.07) (2.74)
LAC -2.00 -3.07* -3.72** -2.72
(2.05) (1.69) (1.46) (1.86)
MNA -0.71 -1.80 2.30* -1.21
(1.88) 1.54 (1.32) (2.01)
SA -0.20 -1.22 -2.35 -0.81
(1.38) (1.27) (1.54) (2.09)
SSA 1.29 -0.78
(1.83) (1.83)
Constant 0.66 -41.18*** 0.97  -47.73*** -6.32* -6.13** 2.38 -5.89
(2.88) (6.77)  (3.49) (10.25) (3.72) (3.05) (4.09) (4.04)
Breusch-Pagan 6.54** 3.32* 10.22*** 11.91***
Hausmann 52.81*** 44.43***
F-test 1.32 7.16*** 1.04 5.98*** 25.16*** 2.71***
Wald-test 15.00 10.79
R
2 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.18
N 72 73 52 53 94 94 63 63
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  F-test/Wald-test  indicate  the  F-statistic/Wald-statistic  for  the  test  on  the  overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1, 3, 5, 7). 
Breusch-Pagan  is  a  Lagrange  multiplier  test  for  the  random  effects model,  distributed  as  chi-squared  under  the  null  of  no 
random  effects. Hausmann is  a test  on fixed or random  effects  estimation, distributed  as chi-squared  under the  null  of no 
difference. y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth 
rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for random 
effects estimation, fe: results for fixed effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries.72
Table 16: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification






all/re all/re dev/re dev/re
Limited flexibility 1.12 0.94 1.32 0.85
(1.19) (0.85) (1.18) (0.96)
Managed floating 0.15 0.76 -1.53 0.18
(1.39) (1.00) (1.57) (1.28)
Freely floating -0.91 0.47 -3.91 -0.59
(1.92) (1.38) (2.95) (2.40)
M2/GDP 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Budget Surplus 0.20 0.07 0.36** 0.16
(0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12)
Adjusted Gini 0.25** 0.19*** 0.22** 0.20**
Coefficient (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Ln(1+inflation) 4.18 1.48 9.74* 4.25
(4.54) (3.25) (5.31) (4.32)
EAP -2.06 1.57 -5.02** -1.37
(1.75) (1.25) (2.54) (2.07)
ECA 0.12 0.37
(3.95) (2.83)
LAC -4.51* -2.83* -6.65*** -2.68
(2.40) (1.72) (2.54) (2.07)
MNA -1.63 -1.80 -3.43 -1.16
(2.21) (1.58) (2.70) (2.20)
SA -0.29 -0.75 -2.61 0.02
(1.83) (1.31) (2.77) (2.26)
SSA 1.08 -0.73
(2.64) (1.89)
Constant -10.41 -7.88 -6.59 -8.41
(4.29) (3.07) (5.16) (4.20)
Breusch-Pagan 4.63** 8.41*** 2.98* 8.30***
Hausmann . . . .
Wald-test 14.70 16.73 16.72 10.87
R
2 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.18
N 95 95 64 64
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard  errors in parentheses. Wald-test indicate the Wald-statistic for the test  on the overall significance  of the 
regression. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null 
of no random effects. Hausmann is a test on fixed or random effects estimation, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
difference. y
q20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth 
rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). re: results for random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: 
developing countries.73
Table 17: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables
distribution effect (System GMM estimation)
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
All Countries Developing Countries










Limited flexibility 0.043 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.050 0.035 0.019 0.016
(0.046) (0.040) (0.020) (0.019) (0.061) (0.058) (0.029) (0.028)
Managed floating 0.089* 0.038 0.041 0.017 0.105* 0.072 0.066** 0.041
(0.046) (0.040) (0.026) (0.023) (0.056) (0.050) (0.032) (0.030)
Freely floating -0.032 0.001 -0.024 -0.023 0.348*** 0.247*** 0.190*** 0.145***
(0.206) (0.009) (0.057) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.025) (0.031)
Freely falling 0.054 -0.010 0.006 -0.022 0.071 0.008 0.026 -0.003
(0.068) (0.079) (0.042) (0.055) (0.069) (0.082) (0.042) (0.055)
Ln(1+inflation) -0.05 -0.02 0 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
(0.13) (0.16) (0.086) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10)
Secondary -0.03 0.01 0.016 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04
Education (0.03) (0.03) (0.017) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Government  -0.002 -0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.006** 0.004
Consumption (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
EAP -0.19** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.01 0.26** -0.01 0.12*
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
ECA 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.17*** 0.11***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
LAC -0.66*** -0.55*** -0.49***-0.55*** -0.48*** -0.21* -0.29*** -0.21***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
MNA -0.21 -0.21* -0.19** -0.28*** 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.07
(0.17) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
SA 0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10** 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.16** 0.25**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
SSA -0.21* -0.34*** -0.21*** -0.35*** .
(0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant -1.08*** -1.21*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -1.43*** -1.54*** -0.88*** -0.99***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
m1 -1.78* -2.23** -2.06** -2.64*** -1.51 -1.88* -1.84* -2.31**
m2 -1.78* -1.46 -1.74* -0.81 -1.13 -0.81 -1.62 -0.47
N 277 267 277 267 165 159 165 159
1 –                                                
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                       




20/40/0.2)  unadjusted  approach  (regressions  without  outliers).  Y
q20c/Y
q40c:  ln(Q
20/40/0.2)  adjusted  approach  (regressions 
without outliers). 74
Table 17: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
Industrial Countries






Limited flexibility -0.004 0.015 -0.033 -0.026
(0.065) (0.048) (0.024) (0.025)
Managed floating 0.006 -0.050 -0.051 -0.064
(0.075) (0.072) (0.041) (0.041)
Free floating -0.103 -0.066 -0.081 -0.073*
(0.120) (0.083) (0.054) (0.041)
Ln(1+inflation) -0.03 0.15 0.20 0.27
(0.36) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21)
Secondary -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02*
Education (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Government  -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002
Consumption (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.90*** -1.22*** -0.49*** -0.58***
(0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
m1 -0.46 -0.82 -0.28 -1.12
m2 -1.45 -1.82* -1.06 -1.50
N 107 103 107 103
1 –                            
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                       




20/40/0.2)  unadjusted  approach  (regressions  without  outliers).  Y
q20c/Y
q40c:  ln(Q
20/40/0.2)  adjusted  approach  (regressions 
without outliers). 75
Table 17: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification
All Countries Developing Countries










Limited flexibility 0.051 0.029 0.018 0.008 0.057 0.022 0.027 0.011
(0.046) (0.041) (0.020) (0.019) (0.062) (0.060) (0.029) (0.030)
Managed floating 0.073* 0.026 0.034 0.011 0.093* 0.055 0.058** 0.034
(0.043) (0.039) (0.024) (0.020) (0.051) (0.047) (0.029) (0.026)
Freely floating 0.042 0.044 0.012 0.002 0.247*** 0.185*** 0.125*** 0.093***
(0.085) (0.075) (0.043) (0.041) (0.087) (0.068) (0.046) (0.032)
Ln(1+inflation) 0.01 0.004 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.003
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08)
Secondary -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04
Education (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Government  0.002 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.006** 0.004
Consumption (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
EAP -0.19** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.04 0.23* -0.03 0.10
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
ECA 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.18*** 0.11***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
LAC -0.67*** -0.56*** -0.49*** -0.56*** -0.51*** -0.26** -0.31*** -0.24***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07)
MNA -0.22 -0.21* -0.20** -0.28*** -0.02 -0.09 -0.002 0.04
(0.17) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
SA 0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10** 0.26** 0.44*** 0.14** 0.23***
(0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
SSA -0.17 -0.30** -0.19*** -0.33*** .
(0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant -1.07*** -1.20*** -0.58*** -0.61*** -1.40*** -1.50*** -0.86*** -0.97***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
m1 -1.76* -2.13** -2.06** -2.72*** -1.56 -1.83* -2.01** -2.48**
m2 -1.87* -1.25 -1.94* -0.75 -1.27 -0.77 -1.77* -0.48
N 275 265 275 265 163 157 163 157
1 –                                                
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                       




20/40/0.2)  unadjusted  approach  (regressions  without  outliers).  Y
q20c/Y
q40c:  ln(Q
20/40/0.2)  adjusted  approach  (regressions 
without outliers). 76
Table 18: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables 
total effect (Growth equation)
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002 Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification










all/ols all/fe dev/ols dev/fe all/ols all/ols dev/ols dev/ols
Crawling peg -1.40 -3.74* -1.11 -3.29 Limited flexibility 1.69 0.60 1.25 0.21
(1.53) (1.79) (1.88) (2.57) (1.03) (0.79) (1.01) (0.74)
Dirty float 1.72 1.00 1.90 -0.53 Managed floating 2.52 1.33 1.74 1.04
(1.79) (2.03) (2.19) (2.94) (1.72) (1.16) (1.61) (1.54)
Flexible 0.43 -0.34 0.73 -0.78 Freely floating 1.11 0.71
(1.47) (1.50) (1.74) (1.84) (1.97) (1.28)
Freely falling 2.81 1.32 1.64 0.28
(2.62) (2.26) (2.81) (2.63)
M2/GDP -0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.05*** 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.15) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Budget  0.36** 0.40* 0.39** -0.27 0.19 -0.06 0.32* 0.01
Surplus (0.10) (0.22) (0.17) (0.50) (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12)
Secondary -0.35 -1.65 0.06 3.11 -0.02 -0.38 0.43 0.05
Education (0.69) (1.67) (1.69) (4.30) (0.70) (0.53) (1.47) (0.98)
Adjusted Gini 0.14 0.88*** 0.11 0.96** 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13
Coefficient (0.14) (0.25) (0.17) (0.41) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11)
Ln(1+inflation) -4.72 11.31 -4.32 -4.48 -2.55 -1.59 -0.03 1.51
(5.08) (10.62) (6.13) (18.20) (6.88) (5.37) (7.78) (6.42)
EAP 0.11 3.05 1.81 1.96 0.75 1.89
(3.05) (2.27) (2.71) (1.93) (2.20) (1.99)
ECA -7.47 -5.93***
(2.29) (1.48)
LAC -4.27 -1.39 -3.28 -3.06 -4.24** -3.33*
(3.64) (2.20) (3.30) (2.34) (2.00) (1.96)
MNA -3.18 0.37 -2.72 -1.54 -2.55 -0.98
(3.43) (2.86) (3.29) (1.77) (2.20) (1.44)
SA 2.04 5.04** 1.96 0.89 1.32 1.04
(1.88) (2.18) (1.93) (1.36) (2.59) (1.90)
SSA -2.51 0.91 0.20
(2.48) (2.65) (1.65)
Constant 0.85 -35.44***-1.13 -46.11** -6.58 -6.20 -2.98 -4.86
(4.71) (9.23) (5.85) (15.83) (4.73) (3.73) (6.08) (4.94)
Breusch-Pagan 0.49 0.14
Hausmann 28.58*** 17.90**
F-test 1.97** 4.52*** 1.47 2.60* 62.03*** 87.05*** 1.84* 3.69***
R –                                                
                         
                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                 
                                                             
p20o: average annual growth rate of the mean income of the first 
quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
q40o: average annual growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile share 
(regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, fe: results for fixed effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: 
developing countries.77
Table 18: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification






all/ols all/ols dev/ols dev/ols
Limited flexibility 1.65 0.62 1.20 0.20
(1.00) (0.78) (1.02) (0.74)
Managed floating 2.56 1.20 1.59 0.92
(1.58) (1.13) (1.61) (1.57)
Freely floating 0.87 1.19 -1.30 0.93
(1.50) (1.24) (2.57) (2.53)
M2/GDP 0.04 0.05** 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Budget Surplus 0.19 -0.05 0.34* 0.005
(0.16) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12)
Adjusted Gini 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13
Coefficient (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12)
Ln(1+inflation) -0.82 -1.33 2.17 -0.09
(4.49) (3.49) (5.81) (5.10)
EAP 1.91 1.91 -0.17 1.99
(2.68) (1.94) (2.18) (2.08)
ECA -7.56*** -5.94***
(2.28) (1.52)
LAC -3.15 -3.04 -5.07** -3.35
(3.26) (2.43) (1.96) (2.07)
MNA -2.57 -1.55 -3.43 -0.92
(3.22) (1.77) (2.28) (1.62)
SA 2.15 -0.80 0.50 1.10
(1.92) (1.35) (2.73) (2.09)
SSA 1.53 0.26
(2.55) (1.64)
Constant -6.97 -5.90* -2.11 -4.77
(4.79) (3.46) (6.18) (5.03)
F-test 63.60*** 92.46*** 2.08** 3.69***
R
2 0.16 0.35 0.25 0.31
N 95 93 63 62
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only passed in equations 10, when powers 
of right-hand side variables are considered (and not passed in all other OLS regressions). y
p20o: average annual growth rate of 
the mean income of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). y
p40o: average annual growth rate of the mean income 
of  the  second  quintile  share  (regressions  without  outliers).  ols:  results  for  pooled  OLS  estimation.  all:  all  countries.  dev: 
developing countries.78
Table 19: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables
total effect (System GMM estimation)
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003: coarse classification
All Countries Developing Countries










Limited flexibility 0.074 0.077 0.068 0.060 0.145 0.134 0.145** 0.122*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.060) (0.059) (0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.074)
Managed floating 0.044 -0.021 -0.005 -0.049 0.116 0.058 0.073 0.010
(0.103) (0.099) (0.086) (0.085) (0.116) (0.118) (0.103) (0.107)
Freely floating 0.010 -0.007 -0.026 -0.006 0.203** 0.096 0.052 -0.014
(0.101) (0.096) (0.073) (0.069) (0.094) (0.096) (0.079) (0.088)
Freely falling 0.154 0.062 0.116 -0.049 0.222* 0.114 0.187* -0.101
(0.121) (0.128) (0.099) (0.102) (0.125) (0.136) (0.102) (0.109)
Civil liberties -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04* -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secondary 0.09* 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.14
Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Government  -0.014** -0.01** -0.012** -0.013** -0.018** -0.024*** -0.018** -0.021**
Consumption (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Life 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
Expectancy (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(1+inflation) -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04
(0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.21) (0.23) (0.29) (0.17) (0.21)
Terms of 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
Trade (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EAP -0.94*** -0.81*** -0.94*** -0.95*** 0.27 0.48* 0.25 0.33
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
ECA 0.33** 0.44*** 0.16 0.15
(0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
LAC -1.32*** -1.19*** -1.12***-1.16*** -0.10 0.10 0.06 0.11
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31)
MNA -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.73*** 0.61** 0.59* 0.53* 0.52*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.30)
SA -1.07*** -1.05*** -1.24*** -1.27*** 0.14 0.28 -0.04 0.03
(0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21)
SSA -1.21*** -1.31*** -1.21*** -1.31*** .
(0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.36)
Constant 4.44*** 4.57*** 5.22*** 5.21*** 3.44*** 3.19*** 4.06*** 3.87***
(0.86) (0.88) (0.81) (0.84) (0.74) (0.77) (0.69) (0.73)
m1 -0.88 -0.92 -0.40 -0.75 -0.54 -0.21 -0.44 -0.53
m2 0.83 -0.70 -0.04 -0.75 0.62 -0.87 1.53 -0.44
N 215 212 215 212 127 127 127 127
1 –                                                
                    79
Table 19: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification
Industrial Countries






Limited flexibility -0.062 0.041 -0.086 -0.076
(0.088) (0.090) (0.063) (0.065)
Managed floating -0.022 -0.108 -0.100 -0.118
(0.127) (0.125) (0.082) (0.082)
Freely floating -0.157 -0.144 -0.129 -0.130*
(0.111) (0.105) (0.081) (0.076)
Civil liberties -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Secondary 0.04 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15***
Education (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Government  -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
Consumption (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Life 0.06*** 0.04* 0.04*** 0.04***
Expectancy (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(1+inflation) -1.16** -0.75** -0.58 -0.45
(0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36)
Terms of 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Trade (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 4.59*** 5.91*** 5.96*** 6.23***
(1.41) (1.42) (1.01) (0.97)
m1 -1.19 -1.19 -1.72* -1.74*
m2 0.16 -1.59 -1.06 -0.53
N 83 80 83 80
1 –                            
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                       
                                                          –              –                                                      
p20s/Y
40s: 
logarithm of mean income of first/second quintile (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Y
p20c/Y
p40c: logarithm of 
mean income of first/second quintile (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). 80
Table 19: continued
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification
All Countries Developing Countries










Limited flexibility 0.072 0.069 0.066 0.058 0.136 0.112 0.139** 0.113*
(0.076) (0.074) (0.059) (0.056) (0.089) (0.088) (0.069) (0.069)
Managed floating 0.051 -0.011 0.016 -0.028 0.135 0.065 0.104 0.037
(0.094) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.100) (0.100) (0.084) (0.087)
Freely floating 0.076 0.034 0.047 0.010 0.210 0.133 0.111 0.052
(0.114) (0.105) (0.083) (0.076) (0.171) (0.164) (0.125) (0.122)
Civil liberties -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04* -0.03 -0.04 -0.05* -0.05*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Secondary 0.09* 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.22* 0.16 0.19 0.17
Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
Government  -0.015*** -0.015** -0.013** -0.014** -0.019** -0.025*** -0.019** -0.022**
Consumption (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Life 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Expectancy (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln(1+inflation) 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13
(0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) (0.25) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19)
Terms of 0.002* 0.003** 0.002* 0.003** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
Trade (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EAP -0.94*** -0.80*** -0.94*** -0.94*** 0.24 0.45* 0.23 0.31
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25)
ECA 0.32** 0.43*** 0.15 0.13
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
LAC -1.32*** -1.19*** -1.11*** -1.16*** -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30)
MNA -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.72*** 0.60** 0.57* 0.53* 0.50*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.30) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29)
SA -1.07*** -1.04*** -1.24*** -1.27*** 0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.01
(0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
SSA -1.17*** -1.26*** -1.19*** -1.27*** .
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36)
Constant 4.63*** 4.76*** 5.39*** 5.36*** 3.84*** 3.57*** 4.37*** 4.16***
(0.82) (0.84) (0.78) (0.81) (0.67) (0.72) (0.66) (0.72)
m1 -0.78 -0.87 -0.41 -0.63 -0.57 -0.15 -0.55 -0.42
m2 0.78 -0.59 -0.16 -0.80 0.70 -0.79 1.48 -0.46
N 213 210 213 210 125 125 125 125
1 –                                                
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                       
                                                          –              –                                                      
p20s/Y
40s: 
logarithm of mean income of first/second quintile (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Y
p20c/Y
p40c: logarithm of 
mean income of first/second quintile (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). 